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ABSTRACT 
PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIES OF THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY 
DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
by L. B. Wilson III 
August 2012 
This thesis investigates the British and German perception of the IRA and claims 
that the organization represented an insurmountable obstacle to the progress of both 
German intelligence and British counter-intelligence. The IRA was also the primary 
contributor to the political troubles oflrish neutrality during World War II. It examines 
the perceived threat of the IRA in the minds of the Irish Prime Minister Eamon de Valera 
and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and those ministers' respective 
governments. The thesis looks at official debates in the British Parliament and the Irish 
Dail as well as interwar newspapers and official records. Additionally, the thesis consults 
the Abwehr II War Diary to compare the Axis interest in the IRA as a means by which to 
prepare an amphibious'assault on Britain through Ireland. By analyzing intelligence 
records, arrest records, and correspondences to and from Eire during the war, this 
research lends insight into the real military potential of the IRA and compares that 
potential to the perceived threat of international terrorism in the 1940s. 
II 
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Popular history of the Second World War revolves around major encounters 
between gargantuan elements such as the Fifth Fleet or the Red Army or the 
Einsatzgruppen. The subversive war for information, fought by spies and saboteurs, is 
often and understandably overlooked. These early spies wrestled with rapidly developing 
communications technologies to protect the secrets and agendas of their respective states 
and to undermine their enemies. One of the most important battlefields for this World 
War II conflict of subversion was Ireland. 1 Its geographic importance to the Germans 
and its virtually indefensible border with Great Britain made the neutral republic an ideal 
staging ground for Abwehr2 spies and the Secret Intelligence Service's (SIS) counter-
intelligence operations. A level of incompetence bordering on buffoonery largely 
characterizes the World War II history of both organizations.3 However, the Irish 
Republican Army's (IRA) interactions with groups on both sides of the conflict have 
been largely overlooked. The marginalization of the IRA contribution to Eire 's World 
War II history is unfortunate because the organization played a central role in the 
intelligence considerations of the German Abwehr, the British SIS, and the Irish 
government. A more thorough consideration of the IRA's actions, its perceived power, 
and its actual power adds important nuance to the history of the unseen war for 
intelligence between Britain and Germany. Even more importantly, the IRA in World 
1 To delineate the island correctly, "Eire" will be used to des ignate the 26 southern counties oflreland, 
which, from 1921 to 1937 was known as The Irish Free State, from 1937-49 was called Eire, and from 
1949 until this writing is called the Republic of Ireland. 
2 Abwehr 11 is the division of German lntell igence during the Second World War that was concerned with 
sabotage. 
3 For a discussion on the weakness of the early iterations of SIS, see F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in 
the Second World War (Cambridge: Cambridge Un iversity Press, 1993). For Abwehr ll 's fa ilures, see 
Enno Stephan , Spies in Ireland. trans. Arthur Davidson (London: Macdonald & Co ., 1963). 
2 
War II represents a variety of ways in which neutral, relatively weak states can impose 
their will upon the interests of drastically more powerful belligerent nations. That the 
IRA did not actually represent the Irish state during WWII is an important point here. 
Further, investigation on this point will demonstrate how asymmetrical warfare in the 
form oflRA terrorism had a larger impact on the conduct of the Second World War than 
has previously been considered. 
This thesis will show that the British and German perception of The IRA 
represented an insurmountable obstacle to the progress of German intelligence, to British 
counter-intelligence, and was the primary contributor to the political troubles of Irish 
neutrality during World War II. It will examine the perceived threat of the IRA in the 
minds of the de Valera4 and Churchill governments separately by looking at official 
debates in the British Parliament and the Irish Dail5 as well as by investigating interwar 
newspapers and official records. Additionally, the thesis will consult the Abwehr II War 
Diary to compare the Axis interest in the IRA as a means by which to prepare an 
amphibious assault on Britain through Ireland. Finally, the thesis analyzes intelligence 
records, arrest records, and correspondences to and from Eire during the war to evaluate 
the real military potential of the IRA. 
The issue of image and reality is an important one to this thesis. It should be 
reemphasized that the IRA represented a perceived tlu·eat. This thesis argues that the 
actual tlu·eat represented by the organization was ultimately negligible, for reasons 
demonstrated later. The reactions, the deployment of soldiers, materiel, and the use of 
political capital by Britain, the U.S., and Germany as a result of this perceived threat, is 
4 
The Free State 's Prime Minister, referred to in this thesis by his Irish title, Taoiseach. 
5 
Irish term for the Free State Parliament. 
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the dimension of the story that concerns this thesis . A collision of cultural and social 
factors with the Second World War's military tension and feeling of emergency cause the 
U.K.'s decision makers to act rashly. Longstanding racial and cultural tensions between 
the U.K. and the Irish informs many of Churchill's decisions during the war, as does the 
Prime Minister's own frustrating experiences in the interwar years as First Lord of the 
Admiralty when he failed to secure enough War Cabinet support to prevent the return of 
the ports at Cobh, Berehaven, and Lough Swilly to the Free State. None of these things, 
the stereotypical racial tensions between Britain and Ireland, the Prime Minister ' s 
personal irritation with the Free State, nor the IRA's own propaganda, were specifically 
military considerations. They all , however, informed the military decisions made by each 
party involved in Irish neutrality in the Second World War. 
As an insurgent, paramilitary organization, the IRA has several inherent 
challenges for scholars. First, the clandestine nature of the organization inhibits a great 
deal of the work that traditional military historians might do. Locating certain IRA un its 
in space and time, particularly during the de Valera years, is a daunting task. During the 
interwar period, de Valera took up a crusade against the IRA in Eire; the result was bad 
news and good news for historians. The bad news was that much of the IRA propaganda 
and correspondence was seized, censored, or both. As of this writing, the Irish 
government has not yet released many these documents, and that has crippled much of 
the existing IRA historiography. The good news, however, is that the crusade against the 
IRA was assigned to the G2, Eire' s military intelligence directorate. These operatives, 
agents, and officers interned hundreds of IRA soldiers and captains during the war, and 
those arrest records are available. By looking at the arrest records, confessions, and 
4 
police reports of the interned IRA, this thesis will present a better picture of the 
composition, location, and operations of the IRA during the Second World War. These 
records will also show the limited capabilities of the IRA to achieve the goals of the 
Abwehr or the fears of the SIS. 
For the impact of IRA operations, this thesis will look to the British War Cabinet, 
the Reports to the Taoiseach, and to the U.K. Public Records Office' s Haller Report. 
The most important operations to the arguments presented here received little or no 
attention in newspapers due to wartime censorship, but the official reports reflect the 
perceived threat of IRA activities and the level of popular and official support that the 
IRA received in Germany and in Britain. This approach will develop the current 
historiography on the IRA by considering the popular and the political fear of the IRA 
and comparing that fear to the success and failure of the organization's terror bombing 
campaigns. 
The history of the interwar IRA is an underdeveloped field. However, as 
intelligence history6 has become more popular since the end of the Cold War and with the 
subsequent opening of closed intelligence files, material on the IRA has crept its way 
back into scholarly purview. Writings on Irish nationalism and on Irish independence are 
abundant, and while these histories would be remiss without mention of their more 
militant cousins, the IRA receives little treatment in many of the narrative histories of 
twentieth century Ireland. What is available for study on the IRA is a spotty and largely 
6 
For clarity, intelligence history, as a discipline, investigates the operations, strateg ies, and experiences of 
intell igence services as a wing of military history. It is not to be confused with intellectual history, which 
investigates changes in paradigm s over time. 
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politicized body of work.7 The politicization ofIRA scholarship results from the fact that 
IRA activities have never left the field of current events. Journalists, then, have been 
regularly looked to for their perspectives on the IRA and its contribution to history. IRA 
histories tend to follow three trends: those that marginalize the role IRA violence in the 
creation of the Irish state, those who decry it as counter-productive, and those who 
overstate the impact of republican violence on politics, society, culture, and warfare. 
Each of these approaches paints an incomplete picture of the IRA and its impact on 
twentieth century Ireland and all of them would be well served to look at IRA terrorism 
as a form of unconventional warfare. Each of them also offers an important perspective, 
methodology, and set of sources for investigation; therefore, this thesis will pick from 
them piecemeal with the intention of presenting a reasoned approach to the IRA in the 
1930s and 40s. 
From the Easter Rising to the Troubles to disarmament to the time of this writing, 
any political, military, or cultural history of Ireland worth its salt has engaged the IRA in 
some way. The trouble in the historiography stems not from a lack of material, but from 
7 
With regards to spotty work, there has been a great deal of research on neutral Eire during the Second 
World War. While the IRA is not the intended subject of these books, in many of these books the IRA 
merits little or no mention while in others the organization ' s clout is totally overstated . For example, Donal 
O' Drisceoil ' s Censorship in Ireland 1939-1945: Neutrality, Politics, and Society (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) investigates the censorship of telegraphs, newspapers, and radio during the war, and even 
while it mentions that the IRA 's letters to and from prison were heavily redacted, it abstains from any 
discussion of the IRA correspondence with foreign powers or the organization 's pirate radio operations 
during the war. Carolle J. Carter's The Shamrock and the Swastika (Palo Alto, California: Pacific Books, 
1977) is considered a groundbreaking work on the subject, but even her section "lrishmen in Germany" 
mainly deals with German espionage interests in the IRA, not the other way around. Similarly, Enno 
Stephan's Spies in Ireland (London: Macdonald & Co, 1963) is an excellent work on Abwehr operations in 
neutral Eire, but the IRA merit only cursory attention. With regards to being over-politicized, see Tim Pat 
Coogan. The IRA. (New York: Praeger, 1970), David O'Donoghue. The Devil 's Deal: The lRA, Nazi 
Germany and the Double L!fe of Jim O 'Donovan (Dublin: New Island Publishers, 20 I 0), Tony Geraghty 
The Irish War (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The Ira 1916-
1979 (The MIT Press, 1970). Each of these books overemphasizes the ubiquity of republican thought in 
Eire throughout its history, leading to an overstatement of the social, political, and consequently the 
military importance of the IRA. 
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an excess of bias. Political histories oflreland are interested in a narrative that describes 
the powers at play on the island; as such, the IRA and its insurgent war appears to largely 
be a nuisance and is eclipsed by the state interests of Britain and the Republic oflreland. 
This perspective is understandable, but precludes the consideration of the IRA as a 
substantial contributor to the political development of the state. 
Social histories get closer to a balanced narrative of the group, but records ofIRA 
members are largely limited to those who are apprehended. As a result of viewing the 
IRA through such a lens, social histories invoke the negative biases and connotations that 
come with terms like insurgent, criminal, and, terrorist. These labels create a 
characterization of the IRA as external to Irish society. This approach, too, is flawed 
because it permits scholars to either overlook the IRA by considering them social 
outliers, or to overemphasize their contributions by considering the group as a popular 
movement. There is a great deal of work done specifically on the IRA or its members, 
but journalists also dominate that field and its evidence is overwhelmingly anecdotal and 
presented with the specific intent of protecting their sources. Dozens of reporters and 
journalists have engaged with the IRA over the past century and a half, and as a result, 
their body of work dwarfs that of the academy. The most prominent of these writers is 
Tim Pat Coogan, but writers like Robert Fisk and, much more recently, Tony Geraghty 
and Kevin Toolis have also written substantial and important works regarding the history 
of the insurgent group. 
Coogan's most important title, The IRA, was first published in 1970 and presented 
a voluminous biography of the organization, its founders, and its political roots. 
However, Coogan's sources in the 1960s were likely embroiled in the IRA-centered 
7 
political turmoil in Ireland commonly referred to as "The Troubles." As such, The IRA is 
presented without a bibliography, and its sources understandably remain protected by 
Coogan. The IRA is an example of impressive, courageous journalism, but the veracity of 
its sources cannot be criticized, nor can Coogan's methodology or analysis, a problem 
extenuated by Coogan 's explicit pro-IRA bias . Ireland's oldest tradition, writes Coogan, 
is "risking health and happiness and even life itself not for themselves, but for an ideal."8 
Another of Coogan's works, Ireland in the 20'h Century, is, like The IRA, 
disturbingly silent on the IRA's darkest period, its involvement with the German Abwehr. 
Notably, both books include sections on Irish neutrality during the Second World War 
that lack any discussion of the IRA liaisons with the Germans or the landing of Abwehr 
agents into Ireland with the assistance of the republicans. Instead, Coogan focuses on de 
Valera's policies dealing with the organization, taking the spotlight from the IRA just in 
time to obscure the organization's most disturbing chapter.9 
A voiding the IRA ' s nastier side in favo r of evaluating the de Valera government 
is another trend in journalistic histories. Robert Fisk, a correspondent for The Times, 
wrote a voluminous book on Irish history entitled In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster, and 
the Price of Neutrality 1939-45. In thi s book, Fisk dedicates a special chapter to the IRA, 
yet discusses them in a vacuum. This is an easy mistake to make, as much of the political 
rhetoric of the day tends to cast the de Valera governn1ent as aggressively anti-IRA. 
However, it bears noting (and Fisk does not) that the de Valera government is 
characterized most clearly by playing both sides against the middle. Throughout the 
Second World War, de Valera masterfully walked the line between declared neutrality 
8 Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA (London: Praeger, 1970). 
9 
T im Pat Coogan, Ireland in the 20'" Century (London: Palgrave, 200 I), 230-297. 
8 
and active support of the Allied cause. Fisk, however, overlooks de Valera's militant 
republican roots and his intimate relationship with men like IRA Director of Chemicals 
Jim O'Donovan in order to paint a picture of a political Ireland that existed separately 
from the militant underground. 10 To support this characterization, Fisk looks to evidence 
outside of the Irish political world rather than to Ireland herself. In Chapter 4 of In Time 
of War, he opens with a quote from Winston Churchill : 
There seems to be a good deal of evidence, or at any rate suspicion, that the U-
boats are being succoured from West of Ireland ports by the malignant section 
with whom de Valera dare not interfere. 11 
While this war suspicion was unfounded, Fisk fai ls to point out the extent to 
which de Valera did interfere with Churchill ' s "malignant section," that is the IRA. The 
result is that, In Time of War, published only slightly after Coogan' s The IRA still falls 
short of a well-rounded account of the political, social, and cultural perspectives. What is 
of particular use, however, is the perception of fear and IRA power that Fisk has 
discovered. However, thi s perception and its importance are difficult fo r j ournal ists to 
uncover. In short, these journalistic narratives lack the methodological perspective to ask 
the right questions of their sources. It is for that reason that intelligence histories are also 
particularly useful to thi s thesis. 
The field of intelligence history has presented a potentially viable source base and 
method with which to investigate the IRA. Intelligence history is not the cure-all for IRA 
historiography, though. As is logical, intelligence sources and the histories that proceed 
from them largely revolve around the major combatants in wars, which Ireland has never 
been. Several influential scholars in intelligence history, however, have investigated and 
'
0 
Robert Fisk, In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster, and the Price of Neutrality 1939-45 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983). See Chapter Four, " Any So1t of Stick to Beat Eire," J 10-1 33. 
11 
Fisk, 11 O 
9 
identified specific IRA dimensions in their work. Their treatment of the IRA is tangential 
to their larger points, but their investigations of IRA activities operate outside of the 
previously stated trends and demonstrate how the available sources might be used in 
conjunction with other methods to tell a more thorough story of the IRA. 
Topping the list of such intelligence histories are Enno Stephan's Spies and 
Ireland and Mark Hull 's Irish Secrets: German Espionage in Ireland 1939-1945. These 
books detail the lengths to which German intelligence agencies conducted operations in 
neutral Ireland during the Second World War. Both Stephan and Hull are clear that no 
such clandestine activity was possible without the involvement of the IRA, and these 
books reflect the place that militant republicans held in the minds of other nations, 
namely Germany. Spies in Ireland was written before any of the British, Irish, or 
American intelligence files had been declassified. Stephan's book illuminates the extent 
to which the German Abwehr II Office was interested in Ireland and, subsequently the 
IRA. While the subject of the book is primarily the German Abwehr and its sources 
gathered from post-war releases from the Abwehr war diary, Stephan's analysis shows 
that while the de Valera government and neutrality were the official conversations being 
had across the world with regard to Ireland, the official "Irish problem" was easily 
sidestepped. 12 This is an important lesson for historians particularly because it begs a 
reconsideration of the impact ofIRA and militant republicans on the Second World War. 
From the Allied perspective of World War II comes a similar vein of investigation 
into IRA politics, procedure, and crime. Paul McMahon's British Spies and Irish Rebels 
and Eunan O' Halpin's Spying on Ireland approach the same issue as Stephan and Hull , 
but from the British perspective. For McMahon and O' Halpin, the British intelligence 
12 
Enno Stephan, Spies in Ireland. Trans. A1 hur Davidson (London: Macdonald, 1963), 33. 
10 
services are debilitated in their earliest counter-intelligence operations against Germany 
( operations conducted in neutral Ireland) because of the influence of the IRA. 
Understanding the IRA is becoming more and more possible as the British, 
American, and Irish governments are releasing more and more classified material with 
regard to intelligence. The end of the Cold War has facilitated this phenomenon, and 
historians Paul McMahon and Eunan O'Halpin have capitalized on the recently 
declassified British files to produce two important books, each with important dimensions 
for the investigation ofIRA impact on wartime decisions in World War II. First, Paul 
McMahon's British Spies and Irish Rebels consults official War Office, Foreign Office, 
and Admiralty records of the First and Second World Wars in order to show the turmoil 
involved in the creation of the UK's first intelligence agency. For McMahon, Ireland 
represented the first test, task, and training ground for the SIS. McMahon's narrative is 
intricately tied to the IRA, as Irish republicanism represents the most local threat to the 
Empire at the turn of the twentieth century. Additionally, McMahon claims that the 
Dublin Municipal Police' s (DMP) experience with IRA informants directly informed the 
creation of SIS's counter-IRA tactics. 13 McMahon's consideration of the DMP is 
important because it provides this thesis with a precedent for how the newly available 
police records might be used to investigate the IRA. 
Published in the same year as British Spies, Eunan O'Halpin's Spying on Ireland 
is a similar intelligence history with equally groundbreaking conclusions, both to the field 
of intelligence history, but also to IRA history. In his attempt to present an "all-agency" 
perspective on British intelligence O'Halpin' s Spying on Ireland has finally placed the 
13 
Paul McMahon. British Spies and Irish Rebels (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 2008), 2-6. 
11 
"Irish problem" into a worldwide perspective. 14 Spying on Ireland, then, takes to task the 
exceptionalism oflrish republican violence. For O'Halpin, militant Irish nationalism 
informed, contributed to, or perhaps even mimicked other nationalist violence throughout 
the Commonwealth. In Egypt, India, and throughout the Middle East, the fundamental 
lack of solid intelligence crippled Great Britain 's capacity to govern, and nationals 
capitalized on that weakness. It was this global crisis, not simply the threat of militant 
Irish, which encouraged the creation of specialized British intelligence agencies. 
O'Halpin engages the IRA in a similar way to McMahon; when the Foreign Office or 
War Office was interested in trying something new, it was the IRA who was their target. 
Through underground cooperation with the DMP and the de Valera government, SIS 
conducted several operations in Ireland, many of which included arrests and double-
crosses. These records have recently been declassified, and while neither O'Halpin nor 
McMahon use them specifically to draw conclusions about the IRA, one can see clearly 
how by investigating the secret interactions between spies and criminals, the story of the 
IRA might be uncovered. 
As a result of the activities of the IRA, covert and diplomatic Abwehr agents and 
SIS operatives found themselves, sometimes unwittingly, in the crossfire between IRA 
insurgents and the Irish police force, the Garda. 15 To fully explore the depth of the IRA 
obstacle for Britain, Germany, and Eire, it is necessary to discuss three topics: the 
relationship between republican Irish organizations and foreign nations; the Sabotage 
14 
Eunan O'Halpin. Spying on Ireland: British Intelligence and Irish Neutrality During the Second World 
War. (Oxford University Press, 2008), vii. The "all-agency" approach investigates the Irish question in 
parallel to other British intelligence concerns during the Second World War and attempts to contextualize 
t~e intelligence interests and clandestine operations in Ireland amidst Britain's general security concerns. 
1
' The Garda is the Free State police service. The Free State's secret intelligence branch is ca lled Garda II, 
or G2. 
12 
Campaign in 1939-40, known as the S-Plan; and the unceasing attempts by the Abwehr to 
infiltrate the United Kingdom through neutral Eire. In each of these dimensions, the 
American, German, and British perception of the tactical and strategic might of the IRA 
was in stark contrast to the organization's actual power, yet a combination of age-old 
ethno-nationalist, political tensions, and sensationalist journalism prompted military 
decisions at the highest levels in Germany, Ireland, Britain, and the United States. 
Militant Irish republicanism, by 1939, had become a global phenomenon. The 
Great Famine of the mid-nineteenth century scattered Irish immigrants across the 
European continent, the British Commonwealth, and the United States. Many of these 
immigrants retained close ties to home and to their immigrant brothers and sisters, and 
large concentrations of Irish populations grew throughout the diaspora, most importantly 
in the United States. While the influx oflrish immigrants in the United States was not 
always well received, the Irish communities in American urban centers like Boston, New 
York, and Chicago were empowered by their large numbers and the ri sing labor 
movement. 16 As a result, by the time of the Anglo-Irish War (1921), Irish-Americans 
represented a substantial voter-base in the United States, and cultural organizations like 
the Gaelic Language League and Clan na Gael were able and willing to lend substantial 
Irish-American support to the struggling Irish back home, including extralegal assistance 
to IRA freedom fighters in the form of cash and weapons. 17 
16 
Labor union leaders like Terence V. Powderly and Mary Harris Jones represent Irish-Americans in 
leadership positions during the political struggle for labor in the United States. For more information on 
the Irish connection to American politics through labor, see Vincent J. Falzone. Terence V Powderly: 
Middle Class Reformer (Wash ington, D.C. : University Press of America, 1978). 
17 
Colin S. Gray, "The Anglo-Irish War 1919-21: Lessons from an Irregular Conflict," Comparative 
Strategy 26, 2007:371. See also Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA (New York: Praeger, 1970), 96-97, I 02. 
13 
While the relationship between Irish-Americans and the Irish in Eire paid the 
most dividends for Irish nationalists, it also bears noting that IRA ambassadors made 
contacts with every other major world power in world during the interwar period. One 
such nationaiist ambassador, "Pa" Murray met personally with Josef Stalin in 1925 to 
discuss a potential shipment of weapons to Ireland. Through Joseph McGarrity and Clan 
na Gael, arrangements were made to ship Thompson machine guns to India to assist in its 
rebellion against British rule.18 One of these ambassadors was General Eoin O'Duffy, 
whose contributions to the international image of the IRA is particularly important to 
understanding the gap between perception and reality of the IRA. O'Duffy, by 1935, had 
fallen out of favor with IRA leaders like Stephen Hayes and Sean Russell for his pro-
fascist leanings. However, a number oflRA men remained loyal to General O'Duffy and 
during the Spanish Civil War, he led a contingent of these Irish militants, called 
Blueshirts, to Spain to fight alongside Francisco Franco. Though in reality a split from 
IRA leadership, O'Duffy's Blueshirts were well received by German and Spanish 
fascists. 
The relationships forged by the IRA demonstrated the energy that the IRA spent 
in order to remain internationally relevant, despite the fact that most of these relationships 
failed to produce meaningful or long-term benefits for the republican cause. Arranged 
weapon shipments, for example, were almost always either detained by local police, 
captured at sea by the British Navy, or confiscated by Irish police forces once they made 
it ashore in Eire. 19 
18 
For more on the Indo-German conspiracy and the involvement of Irish republicans, see Matthew 
Plowman, " Irish Republicans and the Indo-German Conspiracy of World War I," New Hibernia Review 7, 
no. 3 (2003): 81-105. For reference specifically to McGarrity's involvement, refer to 89-90 . 
19 
Coogan, IRA, 96 . 
14 
These failures to secure a steady flow of weapons are important, however, 
because they show the myriad ways in which the British, German, and American 
authorities came to encounter and investigate the potential IRA threat. While the IRA 
was ultimately unsuccessful in securing a large, steady supply of weapons and materiel , 
British customs had no way of knowing the extent to which the Irish were smuggling 
weapons; they only knew that they were. This lack of intelligence in the interwar years 
contributed to the overemphasis of IRA danger by the Churchill government in the early 
years of World War II. To combat the perceived threat, Britain turned the attention of its 
international intelligence agency, the SIS, toward Ireland.20 
The interwar IRA, for the British, was a potential "fifth column" of resistance in 
Ireland. By 1940, following the military successes of the Germans on the continent, a 
British invasion of Ireland became a potentially viable military option both to keep the 
peace there and to bulwark against a potential German U-boat campaign. While a 
political peace and all iance had been attained between the Britain and Ireland in 1923, the 
Churchill government knew that an occupation of Eire was unlikely to occur without 
bloodshed. Covert British intelligence in Eire, then, became particularly important for 
the British war effort as a means to detect potential German actions without engaging in a 
costly invasion of the neutral nation. Eire represented a number of operational and 
strategic resources that Britain needed, the most important of which were the treaty ports 
of Berehaven, Queenstown, and Lough Swilly. These ports had been returned to Eire in 
1938, effectively reducing Britain' s ability to project naval power into the Atlantic by 
2° For more on the time line and specific deployment of intelligence service forces into Ire land, see Paul 
McMahon, British Spies and Irish Rebels (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 2008) and Eunan 
O' Halpin, Spying on Ireland: British Intelligence and Irish Neutrality During the Second World War 
(Oxford University Press, 2008). 
300 miles.21 Moreover, without British naval forces at the Treaty Ports, German 
saboteurs had a way into Britain through neutral Eire. 
15 
With an invasion of Eire off the table and with de Valera denying the ports to the 
British Navy, the Cabinet looked to other ways to handle the Ireland and the war on the 
continent. The result of these strategic concerns was the passage of the Prevention of 
Violence Act in 1939, which permitted British law enforcement to deport Irish citizens 
from the U.K. , and required Irish immigrants to register with the authorities as aliens. 
The British government used this act to strictly police the border between Eire and to 
project its power into Eire throughout the war. Since Britain could not secure the Treaty 
Ports and ensure that no Germans spies could come ashore in Eire, the Prevention of 
Violence Act was used to investigate and intern potential Irish and potentially covert 
German operatives in the U.K. 
For the IRA, the Second World War represented something altogether different. 
The IRA saw the tense military situation as an opportunity to better arm and train its 
members. The organization's most idealistic members invoked a longstanding 
relationship between the Irish republicans and foreign powers with hopes of using those 
relationships after the war to unify Ireland. Following the Irish Civil War that established 
the Irish Free State, the IRA began courting arms and monetary support from Irish-
American organizations such as the Fenian Brotherhood and Clan na Gael as well as from 
Germany and other foreign countries. Aside from its relationship with Clan na Gael, 
most of these courtships came to nothing, though they worked to put IRA members in 
21 
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direct contact with German leadership and politicians in the United States.22 Through its 
political presence in the United States and its consideration by Germany as a wartime 
asset, the IRA was able to remain a primary consideration in German, American, and 
British policies toward Irish neutrality, thus shaping the intelligence war in Eire 
throughout the Second World War. 
However, the clout of the IRA was a matter of perception, not reality. During the 
interwar period, the IRA was broken financially and demoralized. The Irish Civil War 
marked the temporary end of a powerful, sustainable IRA. During the civil war, Irish 
republicans under Eamon de Valera, the leader of the Dail at the time and the country's 
de facto President, fought other Iri sh republicans under Michael Coll ins, the nation' s 
finance minister, one of its treaty delegates to Bri tain, and hero of the Irish War for 
Independence over the terms, conditions, and ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 
1922 that created the Irish Free State. For de Valera and the anti-treaty militants, the 
treaty was old wine in new bottles; the British wou ld allow the southern counties to self-
govern, but they must remain under the dominion of Britain, must swear oaths of 
allegiance to King George V, naming him the head of state, and must pay their portion of 
the imperial debt.23 For Michael Collins and Arthur Griffi th, this concession was the 
" freedom to obtain freedom."24 
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Collins and Griffith, without consulting the Dail, signed the treaty, permitting the 
six northern counties to opt out of Home Rule and remain under the British flag. What 
resulted was a costly war in which de Valera led IRA forces against Michael Collins and 
the army of the Irish Free State, which was now comprised of pro-treaty IRA men. The 
war claimed the lives of Collins and Griffith and left both sides severely crippled in terms 
of leadership, military experience, and international prestige. 
The Irish Civil War was a bloodier conflict than the Anglo-Irish war had been. It 
culled from the IRA its most prominent and proficient leaders. The anti-treaty IRA was 
defeated, and de Valera was jailed until 1924. Many of the Anglo-Irish War IRA 
members, following the bloodshed of the civil war, turned to political and non-violent 
approaches to unifying Ireland and many more turned their attention to the stabilization 
and management of their newly emancipated Eire. When he was released, de Valera 
returned to political life and became the Prime Minister of the Irish Free State; one of his 
earliest actions was to ban the IRA due to the organization' s commitment to violent 
reunification. The organization, then, began its degeneration into a thorn in the sides of 
the British, Irish, and American governments. 
De Valera was able to win in popular elections and appointed ministers from the 
former anti-treaty camp like Defense Minister Frank Aiken; however, it is important to 
note that Eire's government, embodied by the Fiarma Fail25 party, did not represent the 
IRA, nor vice versa. While former anti-treatyites found their power on the rise in the 
government, their distance from the violent IRA prevented the IRA from sharing in their 
triumphs. This complex stubbornness in Irish politics characterizes many of the 
25 
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relationships between the Iri sh government, the IRA, and the Great Powers of the Second 
World War. 
In 1939, considering itself the more val id government oflreland, the then illegal 
Irish Republican Army declared war on Britain.26 The declaration gave the British 
government four days to vacate Northern Ireland under threat ofreprisal if they did not. 
The conflict between Irish republicans and Britain was old news by 1939. To the minds 
of British political leadership, the Anglo-Irish War and the Irish Civil War had already 
forged a new Ireland for the Irish whi le permitting loyal subjects of the British crown to 
remain part of the United Kingdom. 27 As a result, British Parliament largely ignored this 
declaration from the IRA. 28 
Once the British failed to leave No11hern Ireland, the IRA began bombing. The 
plan of attack, referred to as the S-Plan, was the result oflRA debates between Chief of 
Staff Sean Russell and Army Council Member Tom Barry. At the General Army 
Convention in 1938 Barry suggested that civi lian targets in Northern Ireland be chosen 
for the bombing campaign. However, Barry's plan was rejected in favor of Russell' s 
Sabotage Campaign, or S-Plan. The S-Plan targeted military and infrastructure buildings 
with the hope that such attacks would provoke a British military response.29 While the 
bombing campaign failed to accomplish this goal, it succeeded in detonating nearly 100 
bombs throughout the United Kingdom, including one placed in a urinal in Scotland 
26 
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Yard, the headquarters of London's Metropolitan Police.30 The IRA members' 
inexperience with explosives led to several IRA casualties. The first bombing attempt, in 
fact, was on a British customs post that was empty and resulted in the deaths of three IRA 
members who were planting the bombs when they exploded.31 
The IRA considered the S-Plan an abject failure. However, the unintended 
immediate result of the bombing campaign was that both the German and the British 
intelligence communities began to view the IRA as a serious force in Eire. Since neither 
country had a window into the IRA' s tumultuous leadership or its lack of training, each 
was forced to view the IRA through the lens of British police responses to the bombings 
and the newspaper coverage that painted the IRA as representative of the "true 
government of Eire."32 This is not to say that British popular opinion validated the IRA 
as Eire's sovereign government; instead, IRA terror bombings assured the British popular 
audience (and the German intelligence audience by proxy of Berlin's London News 
Office) that the Irish Question was far from settled. 
Officially, the de Valera government in Eire continued to take actions against the 
IRA that assured the British govermnent that a military show of force in Eire was 
unnecessary.33 During the period of bombing (February 1939-March 1940), only Eamon 
de Valera's government in Eire had the knowledge and experience to rightly assess and 
act against the Irish Republican fifth column. British reaction to the S-Plan came in the 
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The act empowered the British Special Branch (MI5) to deport Irish citizens and 
contained a secret concession of Northern Ireland to Eire in 1940 in exchange for Eire 's 
entrance into the war on behalf of the Allies.34 The Germans, too, took notice of the 
attacks and the publicity they received and sent agent Oscar Pfaus to make contact with 
the IRA. In February of 1939, Pfaus made his way through the U.K. into Ireland to make 
contact with the organization. In a clear demonstration of his ignorance of the reality of 
IRA politics, Pfaus arranged to meet with Eoin O'Duffy, the former General who had 
volunteered with the Fascists in the Spanish Civil War. O 'Duffy's alignment with the 
Fascists in Spain had made him and his Blueshirts, social outcasts from the IRA, which 
saw the war in Spain as irrelevant to the struggle for Irish unity. Despite being retired 
from the official IRA, O'Duffy was able to put Pfaus into contact with Seamus 
O'Donovan and Sean Russell, thus continuing a longstanding affair between German 
saboteurs and the IRA. 
The most famous incident of German collusion with Irish mil itants is the Roger 
Casement affair in 1916. Casement was a decorated British consul turned Irish 
revolutionary who arranged for the transportation of several thousand guns from 
Germany to Ireland in April of 1916. These weapons were provided by the German 
government with the hopes that the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB, a precursor to the 
IRA) would use them to foment rebellion in Ireland and divert British military attention 
from the war on the continent. These weapons were rounded up relatively easily and 
Casement was executed as a traitor. 
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A second attempt at smuggling ended similarly for the IRA. After called the 
"Indo-Irish Conspiracy," the IRA's second attempt to smuggle weapons to fight against 
the British involved using German weapons to arm Indian nationalists in that country's 
struggle for independence. That cargo, consisting mostly of Thompson machine guns, 
was transported from New York to Galveston, Texas, where it was loaded onto a train to 
San Diego. While the weapons were eventually detected by authorities in the United 
States, McGarrity and Clan na Gael 's readiness to violate federal law in order to 
undermine British interests worldwide were not forgotten by the United States, by 
Britain, or by Germany. What does, however, seem to have been forgotten, was the 
abject failure of these operations and the ease with which their perpetrators were 
apprehended. 
Eire 's stalwart neutrality throughout World War II raised many obstacles for both 
the Allies and the Axis. For Britain and the United States, a campaign of coercion and 
attempted bribery fell short of conscripting Eire to the Allied cause. For Germany, de 
Valera's stubbornness demonstrated a shared understanding between the two states that 
German occupation of Eire would not be the route to independence or reunification. 
Following German operations in the Saarland, Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and 
Vichy, the de Valera position on German collusion was clear. The German invasions on 
the continent had resulted in an imperialistic expansion for Germany, and de Valera's 
neutrality was Eire's first line of defense against being thusly subjugated. De Valera's 
dedication to neutrality served to keep the British from using Eire for political and 
military aims first and foremost; it produced a similar, if not an even more magnified 
effect, for Germany. Additionally, the close relationship between the Irish and the Irish-
22 
American represented a dangerous connection between Ireland and the United States, 
whose entrance into the war Germany sought to avoid or postpone as long as possible. 
Germany would not invade Eire without cause or invitation, and neither was likely to be 
forthcoming. The Abwehr decided instead to operate covertly on the island until such a 
time as an invasion of Britain became necessary.35 Until their defeat in the Battle of 
Britain and the subsequent abandonment of Operation Sealion, German strategists 
maintained the viability of an invasion oflreland, but only once Irish neutrality could be 
properly subverted and the fear of American intervention dampened. 
De Valera's decision to remain neutral was not surprising. It carried political 
implications that were easily read. The IRA viewed de Valera as a traitor, a turncoat 
from the Anglo-Irish War who had supported them in the taking up of arms against the 
"enemies at the gate" but who had then forsaken them for Michael Collins' cries of "the 
freedom to obtain freedom."36 During this time, the government in Eire was faced with 
the challenge of maintaining its legitimacy in the face of substantial IRA propaganda 
campaigns and the fear of potential IRA violence in Eire. 
As a result of the Garda's ongoing campaign against the IRA, the G2 was able to 
tacitly support the more experienced British SIS intelligence gathering in Eire. 
Additionally, because German Abwehr agents chose to operate independently or with 
IRA assistance, the Garda's pre-existing strategies for ferreting out and interning IRA 
soldiers and sympathizers made them by far the most effective tool for snuffing out 
German intelligence operations in Eire. 
35 
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President de Valera's tacit cooperation with Britain served two purposes. First, it 
gave an ai ling Britain a reason to tum counter-intelligence operations in Ireland over to 
the Irish. Lastly, the neutrality oflreland permitted the de Valera government to 
simultaneously rebuff a future as a German puppet state like Vichy and to formally 
distance itself from Britain, thus paving the road for the Republic oflreland in 1949. 
The war for intelligence, the world of spies and espionage, operates by definition 
beneath the notice of prying eyes. As communications technology advanced by leaps and 
bounds throughout the war, the potential for intelligence warfare developed. The war 
was fought with invisible ink, disguises, and cover-stories, with late night parachutes and 
buried radio sets. Assaults were defended with double-crossing agents whose trust must 
be bought. In this war, however, both the Germans and the British mistook the IRA. 
British paranoia over the efficacy of the group hamstrung its own SIS while German 
admiration of jobs that were, in fact, poorly done ensured that Abwehr agents would be 
easily caught and interned by neutral Eire's police. In a war that is fought with lies and 
misdirection, the contrast between the IRA's actual potential and its perceived menace is 
particularly sharp. 
CHAPTER II 
INTERNATIONAL IRISH REPUBLICANISM 
24 
Historians Michael von Tangen-Page and M.L.R. Smith point out that the IRA 
has "historically been imbued with a sense of military vanguardism."37 As a result of 
this, they argue, "the movement has seen little need to seek external sources of political 
authority and legitimacy through popular consent."38 While there is no argument that the 
IRA sought to describe themselves as Ireland 's true protectors from the oppression of 
"Brittania's Huns,"39 Page and Smith 's vision of the organization paints an incomplete 
picture of the IRA in thi s regard. Their article, "War by Other Means" hangs the IRA's 
actions on the "conviction that exemplary violence will awaken the supposedly latent 
nationalist consciousness of the Irish people,"40 rather than on any grand strategic 
capacity that the IRA may have had. The IRA had, in fact, a significant international 
presence. So significant, in fact, that he organization became a strategic consideration of 
the Allies in the Second World War. 
This chapter will argue that on the eve of the Second World War, the British 
government knew of the prolific international nature of Irish republicanism. The 
internationality oflrish republicanism is important to the narrative of the Second World 
War because it was the IRA's ability to exploit these international concerns that deeply 
concerned and motivated British intelligence and subsequently the British War Cabinet. 
To explore the far-reaching presence of the Irish republican phenomenon, this chapter 
37 
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will discuss political and logistical relationsh ips between IRA and Irish republican 
advocates in Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union, and the United 
States. These relationships are clearly visible through the reports of British intelligence 
agencies that regular! y reported to the Cabinet Office from 1921 to the beginning of the 
war in a series ofreports called the "Reports of Revolutionary Organizations."41 When 
the war began, the Cabinet Office and the War Office were concerned with the capacity 
of the IRA to inflict harm on the United Kingdom. In the interwar years, Irish 
republicanism seemed to British intelligence to be a spreading nuisance, as indeed it was. 
By 1940, the Cabinet reported that the IRA was "almost strong enough to over-run the 
weak Eire forces."42 The Cabinet made it clear that they were preparing to send forces 
into Ireland as a result of the IRA's collusion with the Germans. 
The relationships between the IRA, Irish republicans, the interwar and wartime 
Irish government, and Eire ' s political parties is a convoluted Venn diagram in which 
virtually every pol itical label overlaps with one or most of the others. Useful 
consideration of the IRA during the interwar years, then, requires some clarification on 
who comprised the organization and how they can be identified. In its interwar 
incarnation, the IRA acted outside of the official political power structure, meaning that 
the IRA' s chain of command from the local commanders to the General Staff were not 
office holders in the Irish government.43 While the Irish Government had regular and 
open communication with Britain in the interwar years, the position of the IRA was that 
force was the only language that the British understood. This philosophy led the group to 
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a kind of "military exclusivism: the idea that violence is automatically purposeful 
wherever, and howsoever, employed."44 The Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) and 
IRA leadership believed that the "Army [had] to hew the way for politics to follow."45 
In pursuing this goal, the IRA put itself quickly and powerfully at odds with the 
political structure of Ireland. However, the political crusade against the IRA was not an 
ideological problem, but a practical one. Taoiseach de Valera saw the IRA as too violent 
and criminal, despite his sympathy with the organization's cause. It bears noting that 
many of the Free State officials were, in fact, former IRA men themselves, thus a strict 
ideological line between the Fianna Fail government and the IRA cannot be drawn. The 
Minister of Defense, Frank Aiken, for example, had resigned as an Officer Commanding 
(O.C.) of the IRA only very shortly before being appointed to his cabinet post. De Valera 
himself had fought against the British in the Anglo-Irish War and against Michael 
Collins' Pro-Treaty IRA. This particular factor oflrish politics in the pre-war years is 
important because it demonstrates that Fianna Fail was still powerfu lly connected to the 
republican movement ideologically. The break had come for Irish republicans in the 
prewar years in how to practically operate the free state that they had achieved while 
continuing to struggle for the Six Counties in the north that had remained with the United 
Kingdom. As evidence of the political structure's sympathy for its more radical cousin, 
one need only look to the highly lenient practi ces of law enforcement and lawmakers in 
Ireland in the interwar years. In 1935, for example, de Valera denied Garda requests for 
permission to conduct manhunts for IRA men based on intelligence that they were armed 
with weapons left over from the Irish Civil War. It was de Valera' s belief that men who 
44 
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had fought for the country should be permitted to surrender their weapons voluntarily and 
should not be imprisoned or interned for their reluctance to do so. 46 
The complex relationship between the IRA and the Irish Government created 
obvious problems for British and later American intelligence and strategic decisions. 
While the IRA was the problem, the Irish government was the appropriate agency with 
which to discuss a solution. That the Irish government had passive sympathies and direct 
family or personal connections for the enemy only further complicated these discussions 
and the actions that might result from them. What resulted, between the Irish Free State 
and the United Kingdom, was a relationship in which British politicians advocated the 
importance of diplomatic, peaceful solutions while simultaneously deploying Secret 
Intelligence Service and MIS resources into the Free State to gather intelligence on IRA 
and other potentially violent groups. 
During the Irish Civil War, British intelligence agencies were monitoring the 
activities and weapons traffick ing of IRA agents around the world. In the November 
1922 "Report on Revolutionary Organizations in the United Kingdom," several of these 
agents were identified to the Cabinet Department. For example, the report discusses a 
local sports organizer in Scotland, Art O ' Brien. O'Brien was described in the report as 
"acting as chief Publicity Agent to the Republicans, [who] sends and receives all his 
correspondences by hand, employing women for this purpose."47 The MIS reports also 
identified Sean McGrath, "O'Brien 's aide-de-camp, [who] is known to be acting as a go-
between or introducer for the Republican arms agents, of whom there are several in this 
country at present." Scotland was a particularly troublesome haven for Irish republicans 
46 
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in the interwar years, no doubt because of its proximity to Northern Ireland and 
longstanding familial ti es between Scottish and Irish famil ies. The same report pointed 
out that Glasgow saw the opening of a "Gaelic Literary Revival Society," which the SIS 
believed was another device for "ensnaring young men for the Irish Republican Army."48 
While the example oflrish republican activity in Scotland does, technically, demonstrate 
the organization as an international presence, Scotland and Ireland are so culturally, 
economically, and socially connected, there exists the need to look farther abroad to 
demonstrate the extent of the republican diaspora. In 1922, the SIS reported to the 
Cabinet that Scottish publisher Joe Robinson published a Scottish edition of "Republic of 
Ireland" and was successful obtaining a subscription from a Spanish Republican 
· · 49 orgamzat10n. 
Spain was one of the more important places in Europe where Irish republicans 
were able to build a presence. Following the Irish Civil War, Irish nationalists regularly 
sought a market to spread the word of Iri sh independence and unification in Spain. 
Ireland and Spain each had a predominantly Catholic population and shared a history of 
military cooperation leading back to the sixteenth century. so When the Spanish Civil War 
erupted in 1936, Irish republicans had sympathy for Spainiards on both sides of the 
Fascist line. The IRA was experiencing, at that time, a conflict of its own over how best 
to move the organization forward. Local commanders (OCs) took up the various 
monikers of popular 1930s politics; there were Communist OCs, Liberal OCs, Fascist 
48 Ibid 
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OCs. 51 Hazy lines characterize Irish politics, and IRA politics is no different. In a 
confidential memo dated 4/4/30, the Irish Garda reported on their investigation of anti-
state activiti es: 
It is ... of interest to note that much the same people appear to be behind several 
organizations, Mrs. Maude Gonne [Sean MacBride's mother] being as ubiquitous 
as it is possible to be. 52 
The most important division in this regard, however, was that of Eoin O'Duffy's 
"Blueshirts," IRA men who supported the notions of Fascism and mobilized and traveled 
to Spain to assist Franco's forces during the war. In response, IRA notable Frank Ryan 
followed with a contingent of anti-Franco Irishmen. Franco ' s forces captured Ryan, and 
interestingly the Fianna Fail government took steps to secure his freedom. That the 
Dublin Government sent representation to Spain on the behalf of a known IRA OC belies 
de Valera's sympathies for his former brothers-in-arms. In a correspondence from 
Leopold H. Kerney, Ireland 's Minister to Spain, to Irish Director of Foreign Affairs 
Joseph Walshe, the minister reported on his meeting with a local New York Times 
reporter, saying that Franco was made aware of"' some intervention' [that] had been 
made on behalf of Frank Ryan, and that Franco ' was very annoyed ' that there should be 
any such intervention on behalf of ' such a man. "'53 
Kerney attempted to push some information to Franco through his reporter 
contact that was considered "persona grata" 54 with Franco. He informed the reporter that 
the execution of Ryan might have served to "alienate some sympathy which exists for 
Franco in Ireland." Even more telling in this letter, however, is the minister's suggestion 
51 
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that if no further avenues could be explored for the release of Ryan, " It might be 
worthwhile considering whether the British Agent in Salamanca should not be instructed 
at some early date - in the event that no news reaching us from other sources - to enquire 
at the Ministry for External Affairs in Burgos as to Ryan's fate."55 Rather than to let 
Ryan be executed, a fate he was very likely facing, the Irish government pled for his 
release. Ryan was in fact released, into Germany. There he continued plotting, with the 
German Abwehr, against the British. The Ryan affair demonstrates the complex dilemma 
that befell neutral Ireland in the Second World War, but also shows that the IRA did not 
represent an isolated problem for Great Britain, but rather one that required a huge net of 
international diplomatic connections and resources to monitor. Finally, it serves to 
explain why British attempts to alienate the IRA through counter-intelligence and 
propaganda were resisted by de Valera's government. The Dublin government saw the 
IRA as a problem clearly enough; however, the problem was one for Irishmen to deal 
with and was one that de Valera was unwilling to see handled elsewhere. 
In addition to the IRA 's meddling in the struggles of other countries, the IRA was 
itself was a target for international meddling. When the dust settled after the Irish Civil 
War, the Soviet Union opened its arms to Irish republicans and engaged in talks with 
Eamon de Valera in several occasions. These meetings were considered serious and 
dangerous by British intelligence, as they represented the confluence of two particularly 
dangerous phenomena, communism and Irish Republicanism. As early as 1920, the 
British Home Office 's Directorate oflntelligence published a "Monthly Review of 
Revolutionary Movements" that marked the involvement of Soviet agents with the 
growing discontent in Ireland. The Directorate noted a secret meeting of the Communist 
55 Ibid. 
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International Congress in Berlin on 12 June, 1920, in which "a group of Anarchists has 
been entrusted with special work by Lenin and has been responsible for the sending of 
arms to Ireland."56 Very little ever came of the relationship between the IRA, Irish 
republ icans, and the Soviet Union. The importance of this relationship is in considering 
the perceptions and fears involved in the relationship 's potential, as seen and felt by 
British intelligence. In January 1924, de Valera sent a telegram to USSR to request help 
for imprisoned revolutionaries. The Soviet representative reported back, "Unfortunately 
the international situation does not permit the Soviet Government openly to raise its voice 
against the repressions and injuries inflicted by the British Government in Ireland. " 57 
Soviet reluctance to assist in the republican struggle did not dissuade republicans 
from cultivating relationships with the USSR, however. In 1929, a group of republicans 
calling themselves "The Friends of Soviet Russia" traveled to Moscow to meet with 
Soviet leadership. 58 Among this group were IRA regulars Frank Ryan, Geoffrey Coulter, 
and Kathleen Price. Here again, it is important to di stinguish IRA and republican actions 
from those of the Free State, a distinction that was regularly absent from the threat 
assessments of British intelligence, as the Directorate of Intelligence often related the 
actions of men like Sean MacBride, Frank Ryan, or of the women of Cumann na mBan59 
to the disposition of the Irish government. This relation factors strongly in the inflation 
of the consideration of IRA potential during the Second World War. This relation was 
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profoundly incorrect. In fact, during the Irish Civil War, the Irish government maligned 
the relationship between the republicans and the Soviet Union: 
The guns and ammunition which the irregulars have been trying to buy or borrow 
from Russia may add to the destructions, but will not bring de Valera or any of his 
tail appreciably near to either alternative their programme, either victory over or 
extermination of the Irish nation. 60 
Had the IRA's lasting international connections consisted only of collusion with 
Fascists and p ipe-dreams of Soviet assistance, British fear of the organization may well 
have dwindled as victory in the Second World War became more likely. However, the 
most important international relationships that Irish republicans were able to establish 
were with British Commonwealth countries and the United States. These relationships, 
more than any of the others, made the IRA a factor in the strategic considerations of the 
War Cabinet during the war. 
A thorough discussion of Irish-American fami lial, political , and cultural 
connections could, and has, filled volumes of scholarship. For the purpose of thi s 
chapter, a more concise consideration of this relationship will suffice. In the 1930s, Irish 
republicans found a massive pool of human and fiscal resources in the United States. 
Several organizations in Boston, New York, and Chicago met to support the IRA and the 
unification oflreland. The most important of these groups was Clan na Gael, which 
consisted of political and labor leaders in the United States and which spearheaded much 
of the IRA's resource gathering in the western hemisphere. Several Clan na Gael leaders 
appeared on the British intelligence radar during the interwar years. One example is the 
story of Dr. Patrick McCarten, a republican who was interned after his participation in the 
1916 Easter Rising. McCarten escaped to France and continued to sneak in and out of 
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Ireland, assisting the IRA through the War for Independence and the Civil War. In 1931 , 
McCarten took a secret mission to Ireland from the United States, during which he 
worked with Jim Larkin, Ireland ' s most famous labor leader. British intelligence 
followed McCarten and reported that he was a member of the Irish Progressive League 
and Friends oflrish Freedom, and very influential.61 
The most influential of the American republicans was undeniably Joseph 
McGarrity, a close friend of John Devoy and Eamon de Valera who assisted the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood in the smuggling of arms to India during the First World War.62 
McGarri ty's career with the republican struggle consisted mainly of financ ing and 
political contact management, and he was responsible for arranging the transport of Sean 
Russell during the Second World War to Germany by way of the United States. 
McGarrity and McCarten, to list but two in a long list oflrish-American republican 
activists in a wide range of organizations, each demonstrate the international, diasporic 
nature oflrish republicanism, and, more importantly, of the involvement of republicans 
in Irish affairs. 63 
British intelligence, at the eave of the Second World War, then, was actively 
following, monitoring, and reporting on Irish republicans all over the world. In a report to 
the Cabinet department in 193 1, Special Intelligence Reported that "Irishmen in the 
United States are reported to be planning a revolt against England on a large scale in 
September, in which Ireland, Canada, India, and Persia are to take part. It wi ll be 
financed by the Irish Americans, and is no doubt connected with the reported treaty made 
61 
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by the Nationalist revolutionaries of various countries against Great Britain at 
Moscow."64 This paranoia was, admittedly, as much a fear of the spread of Communism 
as the spread of Irish radicalism, and it should be noted that it was the job of the Special 
Intelligence Directorate to report on all the potential threats to the Crown, no matter their 
magnitude. 65 That is not to say that the Special Intelligence Service had no evidence to 
suggest a legitimate danger in the Irish republicans. As far back as 1921, agents were 
capturing and assisting in the apprehension of gunrunners in the U .K. headed for Ireland. 
On May 26!11, intelligence reports were delivered to the Cabinet regarding five men 
arrested in Manchester. The day before, a police raid in Whalley Range, in Manchester, 
found 618 detonators, 1,719 rounds, 2,583 high explosive charges, 25 rifles, 4 pistols, 6 
bayonets. When questioned, one of the men said, "My orders are not to say anything." 
They were believed to be Sinn Feiners. On the 28111, Irish Republican William Dunne, 
aka Lane, aka The Digger, and his colleague John Punch solicited Sergeant Batty of the 
Kings' Liverpool Regiment to sel l 34 rifles and 10,000 rounds. A fourth man, 
mysteriously called "The Stranger" was at this meeting, though this man was never 
apprehended. 66 In 1930, these reports continued: 
It appears that the IRA is organized on a divisional and brigade basis. War 
material reaches Ireland from Manchester in considerable quantities and Jews are 
said to be active in sending these consignments.67 
Despite the existence of these threats, the human resources devoted to the Special 
Intelligence Service was extremely limited, and as a result the intelligence that came back 
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to the Home Office and the Cabinet was often exaggerated. In reality, the IRA was a 
disorganized group of idealists, and while they were certainly capable of minor 
skirmishes against the United Kingdom, the kind of organized violence that British 
officials saw in the future of the IRA was never possible. In reality, the organization was 
dodging effective police raids in its own country and failing to acquire the support of 
disinterested states around the world. In a Cabinet report written in 1935, the Intelligence 
Directorate reported "messages continue to be carried in Ireland by very young members 
of the Fianna 68, who are exempt from search owing to their youth."69 Irish republicans in 
Scotland, Spain, and the United States very often used women and children to run 
messages, guns, and material to and from Eire in the interwar years, and in a few cases, 
successfully. However, in nearly every way, the IRA suffered from the same economic 
hardships as the rest of interwar Ireland. 70 Resources were scarce and training more so. 
What did exist in both cases was reserved for the battalions on the island, which 
themselves were constantly harried by Garcia raids and Fianna Fail pressure. The 
challenges of the IRA were under-investigated, however. The organization seemed to be 
in bed with all of Britain's enemies at the start of the Second World War, and seemed to 
be poised and ready to strike. As a result of this perception, SIS and the War Cabinet 
took the IRA too seriously. The next chapter will discuss the IRA's most ambitious 
project during the opening years of the Second World War and its catastrophic failure. 
68 
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The worldwide spread of Irish nationalism sets the stage for an international 
understanding of the IRA. This chapter will argue, however, that this understanding was 
skewed and led to a misinformed analysis oflreland in the Second World War. The 
chapter will investigate the organizational troubles of the IRA during the interwar period 
and will conclude with a consideration of the Sabotage Campaign of 1939-40, better 
known as the S-Plan. This series oflRA attacks on Britain represents the culmination of 
the mobilization of all of the IRA's available resources from 1937-39, including its 
human resources, political capital, and munitions. The attacks failed to accomplish the 
IRA's objectives, beyond causing a considerable amount of property damage and a few 
deaths, many of which were the deaths of IRA bombers themselves. Aside from 
describing the inability of the IRA to wage a guerilla war in the immediate wake of 
Partition, this chapte1~ wil l describe how the prejudicial British considerations of the IRA, 
embodied by Winston Churchill 's powerful rhetoric in the wake of the S-Plan attacks, 
were responsible for Britain's strategic military consideration oflreland, a consideration 
shared by the United States and Germany. This chapter argues that the S-Plan is the 
reason for this military consideration, despite its total failure. A thorough explanation of 
the S-Plan and its significance, however, first requires a brief exploration of the state of 
the IRA leading up to the planning and deployment of the 1939 Sabotage Campaign. 
In the years immediately following the Irish Civil War, the IRA was in a state of 
turmoil. Leaders in the organization were faced with a crisis of identity in the wake of 
peace. The IRA, in its official form, had dragged the British to the negotiating table by 
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force of arms in the Anglo-Iri sh War. By the 1930s, however, the IRA had suffered a 
schism as a result of the Irish Civil War. Two militant armed republican factions 
emerged. The pro-treaty faction entered into the official government of the Free State, 
laying down its arms, maintaining its public and international respectability, and turning 
its political power onto the anti-treaty Republicans. The anti-treaty faction became the 
only IRA to speak of in the interwar years. The Old IRA's leaders like Richard Mulcahy 
and William Cosgrave laid down their commitments to armed conflict and took on 
leadership roles in the Free State government, and began wrestling with the crisis of 
identity which resulted from the organization's need to persevere in the struggle for a 
united Ireland while simultaneously taking the victory for which it had fought. It may go 
without saying that the IRA did not share the pro-treaty politicians' views on the future of 
Ireland, but the extent to which the IRA was operating in Ireland lends an understanding 
of how prolific the republican sentiment was in Eire and, more importantly, how 
extensively monitored the situation was . The state of militant republicanism and its 
relationship to the govermnent in Eire is informative because it demonstrates the actual 
weakness of the IRA and the extent to which the Irish govermnent had the situation well 
in hand. From 1933-1940, the Teoiseach received regular reports specifically on the 
militant actions of the IRA.71 The ultimate question for the new generation ofIRA men, 
men like Sean Russell , Stephen Hayes, and Frank Ryan, was how to maintain the 
organization' s legitimacy while making progress toward a united Ireland. Their failure to 
accomplish those goals, and more specifically the ways they were seen to have attempted 
them, informs the larger point of this thesis by demonstrating that while the major powers 
of World War II had some reason to investigate the IRA, neither the Allies nor the Axis 
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committed the necessary resources to intelligence gathering in Ireland in order to get a 
full picture of the organization. 
As seen in Chapter I, the need for legitimacy took the IRA around the world in the 
interwar years, and developing political systems were regularly brought back to the Free 
State and workshopped by politically-minded IRA men. For example, Sean MacBride, a 
chief in the IRA, advocated strongly the need for National Socialism, and was one of the 
chief advocates of Marxism among the laborers in Ireland. 72 Eoin O ' Duffy was an 
advocate of national corporatism when he took former IRA men down to Spain to fight 
with Franco. Longstanding relationships between the Irish and the Germans also 
prompted several meetings between IRA men and German political chiefs. The IRA had 
many irons in many fires, politically and militarily, and this fact, more than any other, 
contributes to the understanding of the essential weakness of the organization in the 
interwar period. Fighting with the Free State authorities, fighting with British law 
enforcement and military intelligence, and, moreover, fighting wi th one another 
characterized the inter-war IRA. 
Despite the infighting and the Free State and British propaganda, the IRA was 
largely accepted, if not expl icitly advocated, by the Irish population in the years 
fo llowing Partition. In 193 1, Garda Detective J. Scully reports that one of hi s informants 
informed him that the Irish Post would deliver any letters the IRA had requested, 
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regardless of the censorship laws. 73 During an attack on the Garda in September of 1942, 
several IRA men escaped capture "carrying a machine gun and other weapons, [they] had 
to pass tlu·ough a crowd of some thirty or forty persons, not one of whom came 
forward."74 The battle for public opinion, therefore, was an uphill battle for the de Valera 
government. Kevin Toolis, author of Rebel Hearts: Journeys Within the IRA 's Soul, 
explains the tacit acceptance of the IRA by recalling the structure of the organization and 
its community ties, saying, "The IRA is a clan-like organization, with extremely strong 
fami ly ties, ties that are almost dynastic in nature."75 The family-centered nature of the 
IRA in the interwar years made de Valera's crusade against the IRA hard to prosecute, 
particularly due to the Teoiseach's rhetoric on the importance on the small towns and his 
desire to see power returned to the land. De Valera's " ideal Ireland was a self-sufficient 
rural republic, Catholic in religion and Irish-speaking."76 Such a pastoral, conservative 
Ireland had , as its constituency, the very families that traditionally contributed to and 
politically defended the IRA. In a report to the Teoiseach in 1940, for example, there 
were seven murders and eighteen attempted murders of former government informants; 
while the evidence pointed to reprisal killings for government cooperation, the local 
police were insistent that " it is not possible to say with certainty whether these crimes 
were ' official' IRA killings."77 The popular acceptance of the IRA is important because 
it further obfuscates the British, American, and German capacity to see the IRA for the 
disorganized group that it was. When Allied and Axis intelligence canvassed the people, 
what they found was crowds of people complicit in the violence and wi lling to protect the 
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perpetrators. To the Allies, this situation led them to connect the IRA with the 
disposition oflreland as a state. To the Germans, it seemed as though the IRA were the 
perfect conduit for sabotage. 
Chapter I discusses the extent to which the IRA was not officially an agent of the 
Irish Government. In fact, a great deal of time and resources in Eire from 193 7-4 5 78 were 
spent attempting to suppress the IRA. A number of legislative measures were taken to 
stop the spread of radical, militant republicanism in the Free State, most notably the 
Offences Against the State Act of 1939. This law permitted the internment without trial 
of individuals implicated in treasonous activity and was directly aimed at isolating IRA 
members.79 The policing of the IRA by the Free State Government from 1930-39 is of 
particular importance because during the Second World War because as Britain 
considered military action against Ireland, the Free State Government shared much of the 
gathered intelligence on the organization with Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, SIS.80 
Eire's Intelligence Service, the Garda II (02) gathered much of this information from 
interned IRA men and women. By 1940, over a thousand IRA men and women were 
interned at Mountjoy Prison and the Offences Against the State Act had produced a 
turnover of paroled IRA men and incoming internees that ensured that tlu·oughout the 
interwar period , 02 had immediate access to 400-600 republican militants. 81 However, 
de Valera' s hope was, prior to 1939, to bring his former comrades-in-arms back to the 
fo ld. The weapons used during the Irish Civil War were permitted to remain in the hands 
78 1937 is an important year here, due to the adoption of the new Irish Constitution, or "de Valera" 
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of the IRA up to a certain point and while de Valera knew that the IRA would use them 
to target the U.K., his hope was that through internment and censorship, the anger and 
sense of betrayal felt by IRA men would wither on the vine. 82 When he took office, 
Eamon de Valera wrote to his Minister of Defense, Frank Aiken, saying: 
... there was throughout the country a quantity of arms that had been used in the 
war of liberation ... the Government announced that it would make no efforts to 
secure those arms until laws had been passed [to protect those militants who 
currently possessed arms] ... when thi s had been done the arms should be confided 
to the public authorities. 83 
The official Free State policies on the IRA waffled between outright attack on the 
organization and quiet passivity regarding its operations. One good example of this 
duality is the case of intelligence files at Bere Island, one of the Treaty Ports surrendered 
to the Irish in 1939. During the withdrawal from the treaty ports in 1939, Irish Army 
Second Lieutenant John Griffin found a British Army intelligence file that laid out a list 
ofIRA sympathizers and which directed that their property be burned. In addition, the 
file designated certain Irish families as pro-British. In 1939, the British governn1ent 
asked for the return of this file, which incriminated the British Army in the very 
trespasses that set them at odds with the IRA, if not with the Free State Government, and 
the people of Ireland. However, despite the fact that the Irish Government had access to 
this intelligence, it did not engage in the endlessly circular grudge-holding that 
categorized the IRA's relationship with the British Armed Forces, though neither did it 
return the intelligence. De Valera's speeches did not make reference to the burning of 
82 NAI OT/SJ J 564A. This repo11 includes correspondence between Eamon de Valera that explicitly 
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houses at the hands of the British; in fact, when he referenced recent violence, he most 
often referred to the Irish Civil War, which had spilled markedly more Irish blood than 
the war with the U.K. 84 As the IRA was coming to terms with its post-Civil War agenda 
in the 1930s, so too was the Free State Government coming to terms with its policies on 
the IRA. Many of the IRA' s members were simultaneously considered heroes of the war 
for independence and criminal violators of the new Free State's laws. The relationship 
between de Valera' s government, the people of Eire, the British Government, and the 
IRA is complex and varies between individuals in each of those groups; however, due to 
his own and his Cabinet's closeness to the IRA personally, professionally, and culturally, 
de Valera' s actions against the IRA proved more informed and more effective, 
unsurprisingly, than those of the Allies or the German Abwehr. This relationship 
likewise made the government in Eire hard to separate from the militant IRA in the eyes 
of British intelligence. 85 
Republican News, one of the IRA's many propaganda machines, wrote in 1940 
that "Churchill is a champion liar, but he can' t hold a candle to de Valera."86 In another 
such propaganda piece, War News published in 1941, "Mr. de Valera had become a 
politician instead of a patriot."87 Despite the IRA 's poor opinion of the Fianna Fail 
government, de Valera's support of neutrality was echoed in the population and in the 
opposition political party, Fine Gael. In a speech to his party, Fine Gael leader Richard 
Mulcahy pointed out that, despite the large number of workers leaving Eire to support the 
British war effo1t (approximately 200,000 workers emigrated to the U.K. between 1939 
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and 1945), alliance with Britain would cost any political party in Ireland a tremendous 
voter base. The group of Irishmen Mulcahy was most concerned with, "that part with the 
greatest possible capacity for nuisance and damage," was undeniably those emotionally, 
socially, culturally, and economically tied to the IRA.88 
Therefore, the de Valera government undertook a policy that focused the Irish 
government's attention inward, particularly tlu·ough the development of the Garda and 
the G2. When viable, Dail Eirann supported the British war effort covertly. In 
September of 1939, as Hitler was invading Poland, British intelligence agencies had their 
eyes on Eire, and G2 entered into correspondence with Scotland Yard over the location of 
missing Republican leaders, among them Frank Ryan and Sean Russell. 89 However, the 
most overt means of support given to the Allied cause came in the form of The 
Emergency Powers Act of 1939. 
The act permitted the Irish government to censor media and control elements of 
production in the country as a means to maintain peace while the world was at war. The 
Act was passed in response to the Christmas Raid on an Irish Army Magazine Fort in 
Dublin in which the IRA made off with several tons of weapons and ammunition. It was 
this attack, perhaps more than any of the IRA' s other crimes that prompted the Free 
State 's crusade against the IRA. Following the raid, de Valera presented a speech to 
Radio Eirann, saying, "the policy of patience has failed and is over. .. if the present law is 
not sufficient [to prevent violence] it will be strengthened."90 Perhaps the most glaring 
example of the tacit alliance between Fianna Fai l and the British was that the Irish radio 
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station, Radio Eireann was prohibited by the Irish government from broadcasting weather 
forecasts in order to prohibit such information from being retrieved by German spies. 
More important to this radio silence, however, was the triangulation used by the Garda to 
isolate and raid IRA propaganda radio transmitters (many of which were paid for or 
provided by the German Abwehr). While the importance (for the Garda) of these 
seizures was the removal of the IRA message from the airwaves and the internment of the 
perpetrators, they routinely deprived inserted German spies the equipment necessary to 
perform their tasks. 
As a result of the Garda ' s ongoing campaign against the IRA, the G2 was able to 
tacitly support the more experienced British SIS in intelligence gathering in Eire. 
Additionally, because German Abwehr agents chose to operate independently or with 
IRA assistance, the Garda' s pre-existing strategies for ferreting out and interning IRA 
soldiers and sympathizers made them by far the most effective tool for snuffing out 
German intelligence operations in Eire. 
The IRA' s crisis of identity came to an end in 193 8 with the return of Sean 
Russell to the organization. From 1927-1936, Russell was the IRA' s Quartermaster 
General and the Army Council' s staunchest advocate fo r expanded military action against 
England.91 Russell was court-martialed by the Army Council in 193 8 for 
misappropriation of organizational funds during his tour in the United States, where he 
met with Clann na Gael ' s Joseph MacGarrity, who shared Russell 's militant views and 
had helped Germany attempt to smuggle guns to India during the First World War.92 His 
court-martial was likely a personal reprisal for Russell ' s vocal opposition to IRA Chief of 
91 Brian Hanley, The I RA: A Documentary History 1916-2005 (Dublin: Gil l & Macmillan Press, 201 0), 65. 
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Staff Tom Barry, but in the IRA's general election in late 1938, Russell ' s friends and 
family in the organization voted to return him to the organization 's inner circle. More 
importantly, the General Assembly also greenlit Russell 's S-Plan. In a publication in the 
Wolfe Tone Weekly in late 1938, the IRA named itself the more valid government of 
Ireland and declared war on Britain.93 For Britain, the conflict between Irish republicans 
and the U.K. was old news, and the Anglo-Irish War and the Irish Civil War had already, 
to the minds of British political leadership, forged a new Ireland for the Irish while 
permitting loyal subjects of the British crown to remain part of the United Kingdom.94 
As a result, this declaration was largely ignored. The declaration gave the British 
government four days to vacate Northern Ireland under threat ofreprisal if they did not. 
The militant side of the plan was the result of debates between Russell and Barry. Barry 
suggested at the General Army Convention in 193 8 that civilian targets in Northern 
Ireland be chosen for the bombing campaign. After having met with an Abwelu· agent in 
Berlin in 1939, however, IRA representative and Russell ' s go-to munitions expert 
Seamus "Big Jim" O'Donovan reported back that terror bombing was discouraged by 
their German allies, and the IRA shifted its targets to British military and government 
targets in the UK. 95 
Beginning in November 193 8 and continuing on and offtlu·ough February 1940, 
the IRA engaged in a terror bombing campaign on British soil. The inexperience of IRA 
members with explosives, the underdevelopment of IRA military intelligence on its 
targets, and the unprofessionalism of the bombers themselves characterized the 
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campaign. The S-Plan's first bombing attempt was on a Briti sh customs post in 
November 1938 that was empty and resulted in the deaths of three IRA members who 
were planting the bombs when they exploded, making them the attack's only casualties. 
On December 291'\ the radio set used to communicate between IRA elements in 
Rathmines and those planting bombs in the U.K. was discovered and captured by the 
Garda, leaving those active elements on British soil without direct orders.96 In February 
of 1940, an IRA arms dump and "armament school" was found and raided by Irish 
forces.97 Additional tactical failures abounded throughout the campaign, including the 
apprehension by British authorities of the S-Plan itself, which was written down in detail 
and carried on the person of one of bombing perpetrators. Years after the war, "Big Jim" 
O'Donovan remarked about the S-Plan that it seemed "as if every IRA man that got 
arrested had made sure that he had a copy of all of our impo1iant [documents] on his 
person."98 Following the increased visibility of the IRA as a result of the S-Plan, the Irish 
government was also able to effectively cripple the organization as the war went on. In 
March of 1940, the Garda arrested twenty-four IRA men. In August the police raided an 
IRA storehouse in Wicklow and apprehended a wireless radio set. In May of 194 1 the 
Garda stormed an IRA meeting in Dublin and arrested twenty-eight IRA officers. By 
March of 194 2, the IRA was experiencing defeat after defeat at the hands of the Irish 
Garda.99 Claiming that the S-Plan fai led tactically is easy enough, but for the purposes of 
understanding the plan 's accurate reflection ofIRA weakness, a strategic look at the plan 
is also necessary, if slightly more complicated. 
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Russell's idea for the S-Plan was not to cripple the British infrastructure, or even 
to force a political reconsideration of Partition. Rather, through the deployment of 
Irishmen into Britain and the S-Plan bombings, Russell 's hope was to prompt a military 
response into the Free State. 100 The Stormont Government101 never viewed the IRA as a 
meaningful threat to Partition. In fact, in the face of war with Germany, having suffered 
through bombings from the Luftwaffe, conscription, and rationing, Northern Ireland 
never raised the issue of voting itself out of the United Kingdom. The Government of 
Ireland Act of 1920 permitted the government to hold a vote to remove itself from the 
UK, thus removing itself from the war and ostensibly siding with the neutral Irish or any 
other faction (though no other faction is a realistic possibility). However, despite having 
the right to vote itself out of the war, Northern Ireland held fast with Britain throughout 
the conflict. 102 If the German bombs could not twist the arm of the Unionists toward 
neutrality, it is unlikely the meager explosives that the IRA could muster would be likely 
to twist it all the way to unification. Additionally, IRA chiefs still looked to Northern 
Ireland as an occupied land; the struggle between Ulster Volunteers and Irish 
Republicans was not, in 1939, the violent monster that it would become in the late 1960s. 
Therefore, it was necessary to direct attacks not at Belfast, but into England proper. 
While naturally Russell could not have known that Britain's military attention 
would be necessarily turned to Poland and Western Europe in 1939, the fact that the 
campaign continued well into 1940 suggests that Russell (by then Chief of Staff of the 
IRA) was poorly informed of the potential of the S-Plan to provoke the British. 
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Moreover, British intelligence, in the form of SIS and MIS, had essentially turned over 
policing of the IRA to the Irish intelligence bureau, 02. MIS Chief Guy Liddell 
remarked in 1942, "as long as the police, and in particular the Metropolitan Police, are 
responsible for IRA activities in this country it seems to me that it is impossible for MIS 
to attempt to obtain information about the organization. 111 03 
Because of Britain's inability to gather sufficient intelligence on the IRA, what 
resulted from the bombing campaign in Britain was the Prevention of Violence Act of 
July 1939. The law empowered the British Special Branch, MIS, to deport Irish citizens 
back to Eire. While the passage of the act demonstrates Britain 's desire to contain Irish 
republicanism to Eire, there are other telling actions taken on behalf of the British 
intelligence community. Whi le the still developing homeland security fo rce, MIS, was 
notably successful in the detaining and deportation of German agents and the potential 
Irish fifth-column in the U.K. , Special Branch's overseas division, the Secret Intelligence 
Service, was tragically underfunded and undermanned. 104 In an attempt to quell the 
violence of the S-Plan and operating on information gathered by SIS, Churchill secretly 
offered to concede Northern Ireland to de Valera in exchange for Eire's entrance into the 
war on behalf of the Allies.105 The concession further demonstrates the British ignorance 
as to the state of the IRA and the balance of power in Eire, which had, by 1940, clearly 
shifted to the Fianna Fail government and away from the militant republican element. In 
fairness, while the S-Plan failed to prompt the military response that Sean Russell hoped 
for, it did have some success politically. Because of the nature of the terror attacks in 
10' , PRO, KV 2/233, "German Agents and Suspected Agents," IO November, 1944. 
104 Hins ley, 166. At the outbreak of the war, SIS consisted of only six fi eld offi cers to cover counter-
inte ll igence operations in Sweden, France, Norway, Belgium, Scotland, and Eire. 
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Britain, Parliament did consider the possibility of a united Ireland. Perhaps, if the world 
had not gone to war in 1939, the IR.A's hopes of uniting Ireland by force might have been 
realized. De Valera ultimately declined the offer, and the Taoiseach maintained the 
image of Irish neutrality throughout the war, but the offer shows plainly that the War 
Cabinet was taking IRA violence seriously and that it was, as of 1939, not separating that 
violence from the interests of the Free State. It is clear that Partition was a powerful issue 
in the interwar relationship between Britain and Ireland; it was ce11ainly the most 
important issue to the IRA. Britain mistakenly believed that it was the most important 
issue to Dublin. 
The unintended, immediate result of the bombing campaign is that both the 
German and the British intelligence communities began to view the IRA as a serious 
force in Eire. Since neither organization had a window into the IRA's tumultuous 
leadership or its lack of training, each was forced to view the IRA through the lens of 
, 
British police responses to the bombings and the newspaper coverage that pain ted the 
IRA as representative of the "true government of Eire." 106 In addition, MI5 and SIS were 
constantly in contest during the early years of the war. Nearly all of the German agents 
that deployed to the British mainland were apprehended; this lent morale capital to the 
Special Branch and contributed heavily to the belief that SIS actions in Eire would be 
similarly successful to those of MI5 in Britain.107 However, because of Britain's inability 
to come to terms on the size and scope of its own security operations, German Abwehr 
agents were permitted largely to operate in Eire with impunity. Because the Abwehr had 
106 Dail Eireann Debates. Houses of the Oireachtas, debates.oireachtas. ie, 2 March 1939. 
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targeted the IRA as its natural ally in Eire, SIS was left largely hamstrung; it lacked the 
authority to apprehend citizens ofEire. 108 As a result of the IRA' s bombings in Britain 
(and later Eire and Northern Ireland), the British Special Branch, SIS and MIS, saw the 
war for intelligence in Eire as inexplicably tied to Irish republicanism and the IRA. It 
was, however, utterly unable to stop the influx of German spies and saboteurs into Eire. 
The Germans, too, took notice of the attacks and the publicity they received. They sent 
agent Oscar Pfaus to make contact with the IRA, thus beginning a disastrous affair 
between Abwehr saboteurs and the IRA. 
The splintered nature of the IRA and its inability to fight effectively for a united 
Ireland was a politically accepted reality in Eire and Northern Ireland in the 1930s. Why 
then did Britain and the United States discuss the IRA as a strategic concern during the 
Second World War? Why did U.S. Ambassador David Gray equate the IRA's 
declaration of war against the English as a declaration of "war against the United 
States?" 109 The answer is in the spiteful treatment of Irish military issues by Winston 
Churchill. Churchill had made a career, albeit a failed one, in b~nging the drum of 
national defense against European political maneuvers. With regard to Iri sh Question, as 
it was called during the Partition debates, Church ill found yet another place where 
foresight and stubbornness meld so thoroughly it is difficult to say which was the cause 
of his antagonism toward later Irish neutrality. Churchill rai led against the return of the 
Treaty Ports to the Free State government because he believed that the installations gave 
Eire the leverage necessary to bargain Irish involvement in war for the surrender of 
108 For an in-depth explanation of Specia l Branch infighting at the start of the Second World War, see 
Andrew, Defend the Realm (2009). 
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Ulster. In a debate in Parliament, then First Lord Churchill, challenged the decision to 
surrender the ports, saying: 
Under this Agreement, it seems to me more than probable ... that Mr. de Valera's 
Government will at some supreme moment of emergency demand the surrender 
of Ulster as an alternative to declaring neutrality ... You hope in their place to have 
good will, strong enough to endure tribulation for your sake. Suppose you have it 
not. It will be no use saying, "Then we will retake the ports." You will have no 
right to do so. To violate Irish neutrality should it be declared at the moment of a 
great war may put you out of court in the opinion of the world. 11 0 
This and other premonitions served to create a confidence in Churchill that he, 
once Prime Minister, was able to capitalize on throughout the war. In regard to the IRA 
and Eire, however, his premonitions were incorrect. The Free State never leveraged 
neutrality against the return of Ulster; in fact the opposite was true. Britain attempted to 
leverage Ulster against neutrality. In another case, Churchill was convinced that German 
U-boats were being refueled in Eire; a logistical impossibility as Eire barely had oil to 
keep the lights on in Dublin and farmers throughout the country were burning turf for 
fuel. 111 Churchill 's fiery attitudes toward Eire are sometimes excused on the grounds of 
ignorance, however, it is important to point out the in many cases, the Prime Minister 
used informed and practical language to communicate with the Free State; in military 
matters, however, Churchill's was personally offended by de Valera's hard-nosed 
negotiation over the Treaty Ports and this informed his emotional and impractical 
consideration of threats from Ireland. This impressionistic belief in the power of Irish 
dissidents combined with the extensive stock that the British and the Americans placed in 
Churchill ' s strategic prowess. That he was wrong about Eire's potential in the Second 
110 
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World War could not be seen past the fact that Churchill was so right about the collapse 
of negotiations with Hitler on the continent. As a result, the Prime Minister took a 
personal interest in intelligence and espionage in Eire, believing that it was a hotbed of 
dissident activity to be used by the Nazis. The next chapter will discuss exactly how ill 
informed this perspective was. 
When the reality of the war clashed against the perceived potential of the IRA, 
shortly after the postponement of Operation Sea Lion, Abwelu· insertion into and British 
intelligence interests in Eire fell off entirely. The next chapter will investigate the extent 




In the previous chapters, this thesis has discussed the reasons why the Great 
Powers misconstrued the power of the Irish Republican Army. Namely, the international 
quality of the organization made it high profile for British intelligence. Its overly 
ambitious bombing campaign at the beginning of the war made it high profile for the 
Germans. This chapter will discuss more specifically the actions taken by the British, 
American, and German governments to contain or use the IRA. These actions are 
important because while the IRA may have been a prolific international organization, if 
the Great Powers ignored the organization, then its importance has been understated with 
good cause. This chapter will argue that, to the contrary, the IRA factored into the 
strategic considerations of the Great Powers in important ways. Between the British and 
American allies, the strategic assets of the Free State were important to North Atlantic 
operations. For the Germans, the geographic proximity of Eire to the U.K. was too 
tempting to ignore. The Free State was surrounded on all sides and occupied internally 
by forces that seemed capable of wrenching her hard won freedom away. For all three, 
the Allies, the Axis, and the Iri sh, the IRA proved a major obstacle. 
In 1939, the British War Cabinet under Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain met 
to discuss the situation in Northern Ireland. Specifically, it discussed the rise in violence 
perpetrated by Irish nationalist republicans and debated whether or not the issue was one 
in which the British government should intervene. At this meeting, the Home Secretary, 
Sir John Anderson, informed the Cabinet that this violence was "a development of 
Imperial policy and not of local policy." The violence was indeed, as it was part of 
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Russell's S-Plan. It was decided, however, that Northern Ireland should handle the IRA 
and the political violence. The cabinet informed the Stormont government that these 
matters were "a matter of maintaining local order. " 112 This early decision is interesting, 
as it sets the stage for the British treatment of Eire and Irish political violence throughout 
the war. No such message was sent to the de Valera government, nor was the 
transmission of such a message discussed. As the war grew more dire, Britain's most 
pressing need from the Free State was the use of that country's southern ports. To secure 
these, the War Cabinet under Chamberlain and under Churchill heard a number of 
suggestions, each of which mired in the trouble of dealing with the IRA. 
Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, made it clear in 1939 that he believed 
"the time had come to make it clear to the Eire Government that [Britain] must have the 
use of these harbours, and intended in any case to use them." 113 Churchill 's aggression 
and willingness to make a unilateral decision with regard to the Free State was a 
recurring theme in the War Cabinet meetings throughout the war. Churchill was 
convinced that the Irish were providing succor to German U-boats, and he was prepared 
to take Eire's southern ports if they would not give them willingly. This option was 
ultimately discouraged by the Secretary of Dominion Affairs and by Dublin 
representative to the Crown Sir John Maffey. Both men suggested that if Britain were to 
make forci ble use of the ports, Eire would not likely resist with military force directly, 
but would " indict [Britain] before the world and rally [the Irish people] people against 
us." 114 
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In addition to these concerns, the Lord Privy Seal remarked in a similar meeting 
in November of that year that despite the presence of Secret Intelligence agents in Eire, 
he was concerned that the IRA "provided just the sort of organisation which the Germans 
could use." 115 The Cabinet reflected that increasing its intelligence resources in Eire in 
order to detect either German or Irish republican sabotage was dangerous and opted 
instead to rely on a pre-existing relationship with the Garda intelligence chief, Colonel 
Liam Archer. 
This decision reflects the prominent fear of the fragile relationship between 
Britain, Eire, and the IRA. It was the Cabinet's belief that Colonel Archer indeed had at 
his disposal, "the whole machinery of the Eire Government" with which to gather 
intelligence and pass that intelligence to Britain. British intelligence chiefs wanted to 
hold on to this valuable asset, to be sure. However, there was a clear concern to maintain 
the secrecy of already embedded British intelligence assets. 11 6 The concern was that if 
Britain were discovered to be harvesting intelligence in Eire, the IRA would be given 
even more traction in its war against Britain. 11 7 Moreover, the Intelligence chiefs 
regarded the Irish police service as "very efficient" and felt that "anything in the nature of 
a large Secret Intelligence Service [in Ireland] would very soon be discovered." 118 
Interestingly enough, however, the War Cabinet never considered that the Garda might be 
effective enough to contain the IRA. 
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By December of 1939 the situation on the Irish coast had become dire. German 
U-boat sightings in the Atlantic had become so common in Eire that they "ceased to 
rouse attention" from the local populace. As a result, the Cabinet approved a Secret 
Intelligence organization to operate in Eire and perform coast watching. 119 When 
German successes in Europe continued, the concern over Eire became more grave. The 
Cabinet suggested that the whole of Ireland might be taken by as few as two thousand 
German soldiers and that diplomatic talks between the Prime Minister and de Valera 
should be changed in tone from one of intelligence cooperation to one of direct 
involvement. It was considered unlikely that de Valera would throw aside neutrality 
altogether, but the British believed they saw clearly that the IRA was a key element in the 
German war plans. The British insisted on the rounding up of IRA men in Eire 
(ironically, a process already several years underway by 1940), and the interment of 
Germans there as well. The British position was most clear by June 16, 1940. In a 
meeting that month, Churchill discussed the proposed pressure to be placed on Eire, and 
its potential consequences: 
If this [the arrest and internment] precipitated a rebellion, as it well might, so 
much the better. The Eire army would then be fighting the IRA and upsetting the 
German arrangements. 120 
It is important to note that during the war, the War Cabinet under Churchill was 
quick to point out that pushing Eire too hard would likely not provoke a military response 
against Britain but would instead push the Irish Army into the hands of the IRA. 12 1 The 
meetings in which the War Cabinet discussed military action in Eire were not even 
superficially concerned with a military response from the Irish Army or the Local 
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Defense Forces (LDF), but were cautious about taking what they needed from Ireland due 
to the potential of the IRA not only to " indict" them to the world but also to mount a 
dangerous insurgency. As a result of this fear, a full-scale occupation of Eire, though 
often suggested by Churchill (both as First Lord of the Admiralty and as Prime Minister), 
was never ordered. Instead, SIS and MI6 spies were sent into Eire to perform 
intelligence gathering and counter-intelligence, with the cooperation of Colonel Archer in 
G2. The War Cabinet, for its part, continued to pressure de Valera and the Government 
diplomatically and politically. 
Talks with de Valera proved most unhelpful. Not only did the Taoiseach display 
a characteristic stubbornness in regard to conceding to British requests, but also the very 
idea of engaging in diplomatic measures with Eire created troubles for the War Cabinet in 
Northern Ireland. In a meeting on 28 June, 1940, the Cabinet received a message from 
Lord James Craig, 211 c1 Viscount Craigavon, the Prime Minister of the Stormont 
government in Northern Ireland. Lord Craigavon expressed his anger and surprise at the 
idea of such negotiations, and demanded to be included in these negotiations. Churchill 
promptly sent a ciphered message to the Stormont government informing them that little 
progress on that front (that is, talks with de Valera) was expected, but that no actions 
would be taken that might affect Northern Ireland without Stormont's input. That the 
message sent to Northern Ireland was ciphered is particularly interesting, and its secrecy 
is telling of the passive hopes of the British government that progress could, in fact, be 
made in discussing the Treaty Ports with de Valera. 122 Had Garda radio monitors 
discovered that Churchill had offered Stormont a say in what transpired between Britain 
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and Eire, it is not hard to imagine a rapid collapse in negotiations between London and 
Dublin. 
The next month, the war cabinet held a meeting to discuss how they might "do 
their best to obtain the assent of the Ulster Government," demonstrating their (the 
Cabinet's) desire to achieve their goals in working with Eire and their willingness to 
deprioritize Lord Craigavon's concerns. The minutes of the meeting demonstrate that the 
Cabinet was interested in "doing their best," but that the concerns of Eire were ultimately 
more important to the war effort, and, if Craigavon could not assent, then Craigavon 
could wait. 123 In fact, the Lord President, Neville Chamberlain, was asked to travel to 
Dublin personally and await a conversation with de Valera over the particulars of 
Britain's proposed deal with Eire. Chamberlain was further instructed to provide an 
"informal" letter to Craigavon laying out the general expectations of this meeting. 
However, in the same meeting, the Cabinet realized that while Chamberlain was 
essentially going to Dublin just to take de Valera's temperature on the issue of collusion, 
that action was likely to be construed as "an offer." Chamberlain was empowered, in 
such a situation, to close the deal and get use of the ports. 124 
While Britain may seem to have been willing to destroy its relationship with 
Ireland (North and South) over the Treaty Ports, it is worthwhile to discuss briefly what 
Britain offered in return. On July 1911\ Chamberlain returned with his report. His talk 
with de Valera confirmed that the Dublin government was concerned most with the 
possibi lity of a British invasion. De Valera's fear was that, due to the violence 
perpetrated by the S-Plan and because of the tenuous position of Eire geographically, that 




Britain would disregard Eire's claims to self-determination and occupy her in the name of 
war. De Valera's second concern was equally grave; that Germany would do the same 
thing. The War Cabinet decided to supply the Irish with war materiel in order to sway 
Irish public opinion back toward the British and to draw the Irish government into 
believing that a German invasion was more likely. 125 Earlier that month, Joseph Walshe 
informed the crown's minister to Dublin, Sir John Maffey, that the Iri sh government 
would ignore any attacks against Axis ships that took place in Irish territorial waters. 
Walshe said the government in Eire could "turn a blind eye to any such action ... provided 
[British] activities were conducted in such a way as not to excite comment."126 While the 
Dublin government never agreed to give over the treaty ports, this concession did permit 
the British navy to engage and destroy any enemy warships found off the coast of Ireland, 
and, since most of the coast-watching groups that the SIS had observed lacked even the 
most basic materiel, the chances of "exciting comment" was quite low. During the 
meeting in which John Maffey's report was received, the Cabinet approved a proposal to 
contact President Franklin Roosevelt that, "in order to forestall German action," the 
British were considering a radical change in their policy toward Eire. 127 
The radical change was that after 1941 , British policy in the Eire became 
cooperative. If the treaty ports could not be obtained, the collusion of the Free State 
Government would suffice. This collusion had to be hidden, however, for fear of 
exciting comment from the IRA. 
The question oflrish neutrality is becoming more important as historians of the 
Second World War look to smaller states to see the social, political, and intellectual 
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impact of the conflict. Holly Case's Between States offers points out "small states matter. 
The perspective of small states places the struggle for mastery among Europe's Great 
Powers in a new and perhaps chastening perspective." 128 Similarly, the struggles that the 
de Valera government faced over maintaining neutrality shines some light on the 
political, if not material, importance of the IRA. 
It is generally accepted that neutrality was the only realistic political and military 
option for Ireland during the Second World War. 129 However, economic necessities, 
physical proximity, and cultural and familial ties to Britain caused Ireland to abandon 
neutrality, if not explicitly. These connections between Britain and Ireland clashed with 
tensions between the Fianna Fail government and the country's radical republican 
elements embodied by the IRA. The IRA was banned as in 1936 and had undergone a 
substantial reorganization by 1941 . 
Under the leadership of Sean Russell, the most militant of IRA gunmen and 
politicians were still quite active. The group 's commitment to violence against the 
British from 193 7 to the beginning of the war prompted German Abwelu· decision makers 
to approach the group as a means by which to deny Ireland to Britain geographically and 
politically.130 The IRA's collusion with the Third Reich became an elephant in the room 
that no official government could discuss openly. The Irish government could not risk 
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confirming Axis espionage operations for fear of Allied invasion, the German 
government could not risk confirming these operations for fear of pushing Ireland into 
the arms of the Allies, and the U.S. and Britain could not interfere in Irish affairs without 
damaging their claims to support democracy. As a result, Ireland engaged in the 
censorship of free press and in secret arrangements with both Britain and the United 
States in order to fulfill her political obligations and to simultaneously reinforce a popular 
image of self-determinism and non-belligerence. 
However, as Clair Wills points out, while Ireland was able to force some distance 
between itself and Britain politically, the reality of limited Irish agricultural and industrial 
production and its reliance on British goods created problems for the kind of absolute 
neutrality to which de Valera and Fianna Fail had committed the country. 131 Among 
these problems, motivating young Irish men to serve in the Local Defense Forces rather 
than joining the British Army and the draw of working Irishmen in Britain's war 
industries proved specifically problematic for the Fianna Fail party. Additionally, there 
was, within the Dail, a persistent attitude among Fianna Fail's opponents that Ireland, by 
virtue of its reliance on Britain's economy, owed a debt of service to the nation as it 
entered the war. 132 The extent oflreland 's reliance on Britain is evident in March of 
1939, when in a correspondence between Ireland 's minister to Berlin, Charles Bewley, 
and the Minister of External Affairs, Joseph Walshe. Bewley was a solicitor and 
supporter of German National Socialism, and wrote to the Free State government about 
his efforts to build favorable relations between Ireland and Germany. Walshe instructed 
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Bewley to look for markets outside of Britain, and the Dublin minister informed Walshe 
that Ireland was importing 11.3 times as much as they were exporting to countries other 
than Britain, Northern Ireland, and Germany. The desire of the Free State was to 
establish a more favorable trade ratio with Germany, and Bewley pressed Germany for a 
ratio of 2:3. In this radical suggestion, it is clear that the Free State Government may 
have looked at Germany as a market, but the demand for a balance of trade with 
Germany was inconsistent with Ireland ' s economic engagements elsewhere. Bewley 
recalled a conversation with an Irish industrial ist in Berlin who pointed out that Ireland 
was willing to buy goods from Sweden without any stipulation that Sweden should buy 
Irish goods, yet the state insisted that a ratio of 2:3 should exist between Ireland and 
Germany. The half-hearted attempt to maintain this favorable relationship is indicative of 
Ireland's reliance on British markets. The Free State wanted to capitalize on the German 
market, but since it was already exporting the vast majority of its goods to Britain, 
Ireland ' s choice of what side of the Second World War to take was largely decided for 
her despite support for Germany among some elements of the Irish government. 
Walshe's desire for economic cooperation with Germany had political 
underpinnings. The minister advised that the German Press should be approached about 
"securing publicity for the campaign against the Partition oflreland." 133 However, the 
Free State was unwilling to press its own media machine to support rising German anti-
British propaganda. In his letter to Walshe, Bewley writes: 
Various German officials had mentioned to me their very great regret at the anti-
German attitude of the press in Ireland, and suggested that it could scarcely be 
expected that the German press should help an Irish campaign for reunion while 
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(Dublin). 49/3 1." 28 March 1939. 
64 
the Irish press considered itself at liberty to indulge in abuse of the German state 
and its ru lers. 134 
The Department of External Affairs, however, indicated to Bewley that it did not 
propose to restrain the Irish newspapers from commenting as they desired on the policy 
of the German government, despite a massive censorship campaign that was already 
taking place in Ireland regarding war news. 135 Bewley was frustrated with his task, 
pointing out that "the chief obstacle at present is not on the German, but on the Irish, side, 
notably the attacks on Germany in the Irish papers and particularly in the Irish Press, 
which the authori ties have regard as expressing the views of the Irish Government." 136 
The Irish Government never portrayed an openly anti-German perspective, but its 
duplicitous methods in dealing with Germany and its unwillingness to condone any of 
Bewley's plans indicates its incentives in supporting British interests. Additionally, it 
should be noted that these correspondences demonstrate that as early as 193 9, German 
officials were staying informed on Irish affairs through the Irish press. Bewley's 
experience in Germany also shows that early in the war, the Germans had the opportunity 
to see that the Free State would not be a willing ally. 
The collaboration between the Free State and British authorities also demonstrates 
in measurable ways the extent to which Ireland was unable to maintain fu ll neutrality, 
especially once the IRA began looking to foreign nations for assistance in its own war 
against Britain. This is important because Allied leaders, particularly Churchill and U.S. 
Ambassador to Ireland David Gray, viewed Irish neutrality in 1939 as political 
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opportunism. 137 By 1940, Britain's defeat at the hands of the Germans seemed 
inevitable, as evidenced by Joseph Walshe' s letter to de Valera in June of that year, 
saying, "neither time nor gold can beat Germany." 138 The Fianna Fail government never 
provided assistance to the Axis, and did not change its attitude in the wake of what 
seemed inevitable German victory. Churchill was convinced the German U-boats were 
being refueled on the coast oflreland, but this suspicion rested more on Churchill 's 
personal frustrations over the return of the Treaty Ports in 1939, which he had 
vehemently opposed, than on Ireland' s opportunism. 139 Quite the contrary, Ireland 's 
neutrality belied not only a working, economic relationship with Britain but also an 
ideological alignment between Ireland and her former oppressor. 
Unfortunately, de Valera's vision was not one that militant Irish republicans 
shared. Since the IRA was unable to push the Free State government into open war 
against the British, the organization threw its lot in with Germany to throw Britain from 
Ireland. The relationship between Irish republicans and Germany predates the Second 
World War and has some roots in the First World War, both with the well publicized 
Roger Casement affair and with the less publicized Indo-Irish conspiracy in which Irish-
American republicans under the leadership of Clan na Gael's Joseph McGarrity 
attempted to smuggle weapons to India during its revolution against the Crown. 140 
Tlu·oughout the war, the Free State government took a number of measures to control 
IRA activity, including the passage oflaws that suspended the due process of individuals 
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Ireland' s Second World War," The Independent, December 4, 20 I 0 . 
139 For Churchi ll ' s suspicions, see Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War Vol. I: The Gathering 
Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), 662 . 
140 Plowman, 81- 105. 
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suspected of offences against the state. This resulted in the internment of over a thousand 
suspected republicans from 1939-45 with between four and six hundred being in captivity 
at any given point of the war. 141 
This action was hardly unfounded. In July of 1940, the Germans attempted a 
landing of three agents, two of Indian descent and one German, who were promptly 
apprehended and arrested by Irish authorities who spotted their vessel while it was still at 
sea. These agents carried explosive bombs and sabotage equipment intended for IRA-
supported bombing missions in the UK, thought by SIS to be headed for Northern 
Ireland, but more likely headed for Britain. 142 Gunter Shutz landed in Eire in March of 
194 1 with orders to provide information on the condition of Great Britain, particularly 
with regard to the effectiveness of Operation Bernhard , a counterfeiting operation 
designed to weaken the British pound. Though Shutz was quickly captured, his almost 
immediate escape left him at large for two months before he was brought back to the 
newly established internment camp at Athlone barracks.143 Shutz had found refuge at the 
home of Mrs. Cathal Brugha, widow of the Irish patriot and a known IRA sympathizer. 144 
Tlu·oughout the war, Abwehr agents of all stripes found succor, cash, and 
assistance amongst the IRA. The most famous of these agents was Herman Goertz, who 
parachuted into Ireland wearing his German Army uniform, complete with his World 
War I medals and honors. Goertz met with several IRA members and was given refuge 
in their safe houses, where he set up a radio set in the home of IRA notable Stephen Held. 
Held' s home was promptly raided and Goertz's notes on the potential German-supported 
14 1 NA!, OT S I 1564A. 
142 PROK V 2/ 1296, "Otto Dietergae1t ner," I . 
143 PRO KV 2/ 1298. This fi le is labeled "Han s Marchner" but Marchner is the South Afri can al ias of 
Gunter Shutz. 
144 PRO KV 2/ 1300, "Gunter Max Oscar Schutz," I. 
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invasion of Northern Ireland, called Plan Kathleen, were discovered, along with his radio. 
Goertz went on the run and was apprehended in Dublin in 1941 , along with a number of 
other IRA members. In proper spy form, he ingested a cyanide tablet in custody after 
divulging his entire plan and an account of all of his actions in Eire. 145 
Ironically, even when the IRA operations and German intelligence operations 
were not directly bound up together, the local struggles between the de Valera 
government and the IRA caused considerable troubles for inserted agents. In the summer 
of 1940, one of the Abwehr's more successful agents, Walter Simon, came ashore in 
Ireland 's Dingle Bay and managed to hide his radio set. While riding on a train to 
Dublin, the agent was asked by some local men if he was waiting on a man from the IRA. 
He jokingly responded, "Are you from the IRA?" and they arrested him for being a 
member of the then-outlawed organization. He was turned over to the authorities where 
he was searched; his secret messages (which he'd sewn into his clothes) were uncovered 
and he was arrested and spent the remainder of the war in Mountjoy Prison. 146 This story 
was a typical one. Ireland's homeland security forces waged an effective war against the 
IRA from 1939-1945; German spies found themselves simply allied to the losing side. 
The strategic implications of the alliance were not lost on the Allied intelligence 
services. As a result, the Fianna Fail government was pressured from Britain and the 
United States to curb the IRA trouble. One of the government' s most important pieces of 
legislation to accomplish this task was Free State's Offenses Against the State Act. This 
act permitted the Irish government to censor media and control elements of its 
production. It was passed in response to the Clu·istmas Raid on an Irish Army Magazine 
145 PRO KV 2/1322, "Hermann Goe1tz," I. 
146 David Kahn. Hitler 's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War ff (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Da Capo Press, 1978), 305 . 
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Fott in Dublin in which the IRA made off with several tons of weapons and ammunition. 
Following the raid, de Valera presented a speech to Radio Eirann, saying, "The policy of 
patience has failed and is over ... if the present law is not sufficient [to prevent violence] it 
will be strengthened." 147 The crusade against the IRA led to perhaps the most glaring 
example of the tacit alliance between Fianna Fail and the British. Under the Act, Radio 
Eirann was prohibited from broadcasting weather forecasts in order to prevent such 
information from being retrieved by German spies. The broadcast of the weather had 
virtually no effect on the apprehension, monitoring, or conviction of IRA terrori sts. The 
radio silence was specifically designed to protect Allied strategic interests. More 
important to this radio silence, however, was the triangulation used by the Garda to 
isolate and raid IRA propaganda radio transmitters, many of which were paid for or 
provided by the German Abwehr. 148 The impo1tance of these seizures for the Garda was 
the removal of the IRA message from the airwaves and the internment of the perpetrators, 
but they routinely deprived German spies the equipment necessary to perform their tasks. 
The result of the clandestine sabotage perpetrated by German spies in Ireland was 
that de Valera was faced with a dangerous balancing act. By accepting outright British 
assistance in policing not only German spies, but also Irish rebels (to borrow from Paul 
McMahon) 149, de Valera would have risked compromising the independence that he had 
personally fought for in the Anglo-Irish War. By refusing British cooperation, he risked 
the collapse of the most fundamental economic relationship to the Free State. 
Additionally, after 1940, there was a fear of invasion not from the Germans but from the 
147 NAI DT/ J 1654A 
148 Specifically, Abwehr JI, Nazi Germany' s intelligence service specializing in international sabotage. For 
more on IRA and German collusion, see Carolle J. Carter 's The Shamrock and the Swastika (Palo Al to: 
Pacific Books, 1977). 
149 British Spies and Irish Rebels is the title of Paul McMahon' s book on the subject. 
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Allies, who saw IRA collusion with the Abwehr as cause for occupying Ireland. One 
must also keep in mind that de Valera himself was a republican at heart. The crusade 
against the IRA was not an ideological problem, but a practical one. De Valera saw the 
IRA as too violent and criminal, despite his sympathy with their cause. In 1935, de 
Valera denied Garda requests for permission to conduct manhunts for IRA men based on 
intelligence that they were armed with weapons left over from the Irish Civil War. 150 
In a letter from U.S. Ambassador to Ireland David Gray to Taoiseach de Valera in 
September of 1943 , he detailed the U.S. disappointment in the Free State's neutrality. At 
that point, the U.S. had given Ireland 20,000 rifles as well as two cargo ships, both of 
which had been consequently sunk by the Axis powers en route to Ireland. Perhaps the 
most interesting of the Ambassador's complaints, however, is his attention to the IRA. 
He informed the Taoiseach, "The IRA has issued a manifesto declaring war against the 
United States [as a result of the U.S. stationing of troops in Northern Ireland] and is 
presumably at war with us in conjunction with the Axis all ies." 151 The United States, 
through Ambassador Gray, declared that Ireland was acting counter to its own interests. 
Gray felt that Ireland 's place was with the Allies due to a longstanding familial tie 
between Irish Americans and the Irish. Churchill was viru lently opposed to Irish 
neutrality, even though Britain continued to reap economic and political benefits from its 
relationship with Ireland. However, Ireland feared invasion not only from Germany but 
also from the Allies, as well as the danger of civil war erupting from its more radical 
republican population. In the end, Fianna Fail 's challenge was to appear neutral and non-
belligerent. The reality of her position was to be hidden from everyone who was looking. 
150 NA! DT S I I 564A 
15 1 PRO, CA B 66/40/37, "Letter from David Gray to Eamon de Valera." 
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This duplicity was not isolated to the office of the Taoiseach, either. In 1944, 
James Dillon, the Dail ' s representative from West Donegal, made a comment to the Dail 
on the U.S.'s request that Eire deport German and Japanese legation representatives. 
Dillon supported the suggestion, and throughout his speech refers to Eire's interests 
"within the Commonwealth." The importance of this language cannot be ignored, given 
that in 1937 Eire had all but declared its exit from the Commonwealth with its new 
Constitution. Dillon went on to say, "Unless [we] come up with a way to live with the 
British, there is no hope of dissolving the Border. " It is clear that by 1944, Eire was 
firmly in the Allied corner. 152 
The investigation of the Free State's actions to preserve the image oflrish 
neutrality opens new resources through which to view the importance of the Irish 
Republican Army in the Second World War. Firstly, the British Government, as seen 
through the War Office, Home Office, and Cabinet records, acted cautiously with regard 
to the Free State, fearful that the country was volatile due to the movements oflRA 
terrorists. Because of this fear, Churchill ' s more aggressive plans to simply take from 
Eire what Britain needed in the war were discouraged. It was the IRA, then, that 
incentivized the British to respect Irish neutrality and attempt to work with, rather than 
against, the Free State. Secondly, the Germans saw the IRA as a potential sabotage 
platform in Eire, for use either in the U.K. or in Eire herself. Since many of the Abwehr 
Il 's records were destroyed during or in the wake of the war, it is only by looking into de 
Valera's troubles with Germany over neutrality that the central position of the IRA in that 
relationship is visible. 
152 CAB 66/54/27 "War Cabinet Report for the Month of July 1944 for the Dominions, Ind ia, Burma, and 




The question of what place should be accorded to the IRA during the Second 
World War is complex. This thesis has demonstrated that, as a strategic consideration, the 
IRA deserves a place in the narrative of Britain and Germany' s war in the North Atlantic. 
However, further investigation into the organization and, more importantly, in the 
reactions to the organization from other, greater military powers, is likely to yield 
insights that current scholars of international policy, terrorism, and counter-insurgency 
will find valuable. The experiences of great powers (mainly the U.K. and the United 
States) with the Irish Republican Army is of use to scholars of counter-insurgency 
because they offer comparisons to other, more high-profile insurgent conflicts. Militant 
Irish republicanism has persisted since the 18111 century; therefore, Britain's responses to 
it provide a backdrop for the consideration of other insurgent conflicts. This is helpful 
mostly because it allows for the consideration of insurgent conflicts and counter-
insurgency outside of a vacuum. David Galula 's Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958 
provides a cornerstone study of counterinsurgency, but the armed, insurgent struggles 
between Britain and Ireland existed long before, during, and long after France' s conflict 
in Algeria. The policies and practices of prosecuting modern counter-insurgency all exist 
in the foreground of British conflicts in Ireland. While this does not mean that anti-IRA 
operations necessarily inform COIN operations around the world, it does mean that Irish 
insurgency offers a wealth of comparative opportunities for future research. These 
comparisons extend beyond COIN and are similarly useful in the development of the 
historiography of terrorism. 
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In his 1995 book, Fighting Terrorism, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
described with great zeal how democracies could defeat radical, international terrorist 
cells. In the foreword to the 2001 edition, published after the September 11 111 attacks in 
New York, he offered a few prescriptions on how to accomplish victory against terrorists, 
one of which is to "consider the terrorists enemies of mankind, to [give them] no quarter 
and no consideration for their purported grievances."153 Netanyahu's suggestion here is a 
indicative of an historiographical theory on the consideration of terrorism ( and 
subsequently counter-insurgency), one that gauges a great power's success in dealing 
with smaller, asymmetrical forces in terms of the destruction of the smaller force . This 
suggestion is as sad as it is interesting, particularly considering Netanyahu 's next 
paragraph: 
This same clarity enabled the Allies to root out Nazism in the twentieth century. 
They did not look for the "root cause" .. . of Nazism- because they knew that 
some acts are evil in and of themselves. 
Unfortunately, this statement is barely, if at all, true. This history of British 
intelligence throughout the interwar years demonstrates that the "clarity" needed to 
destroy a state or its government comes only after nearly a decade of trying other options. 
In the example of the British relationship with the IRA and the Free State, the "clarity" 
necessary to invade and to give the IRA "no quarter" has, of this writing, still not come. 
Granted, there is a level of ferocity in the rhetoric surrounding the defeat of terrorism, 
and granted that that rhetoric was at its pinnacle in 2001. However, the methods that 
Britain has used since the late nineteenth century to combat Irish republican violence 
153 Benjamin Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat the International Terrorist 
Network (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 200 I), xxi. 
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offers a wealth of material with which to evaluate the efficacy of international counter-
terrorism policies. 
Chapters I and III discuss in various ways how the British War Cabinet failed , in 
several points during the build up of the Second World War and in the war's early years, 
to separate Irish republican violence from the interests of the Free State. In response to 
the September 11th attacks, Netanyahu and U.S. President George W. Bush offered a 
similar mistake. "We must make no distinction between the terrorists and the states that 
support them," writes Netanyahu. 154 This is fascinating because it illustrates the 
chastening perspective that Holly Case suggested might be found by looking at smaller 
states. It shows that very little has changed since the 1990s in terms of viewing terrorism 
or counter-insurgency. Powerful states troubled by small insurgent groups are likely to 
construct an enemy large enough to fight; such was certainly the case in the Second 
World War between the British and the Free State. 
After the war, John Maffey made a statement about Eire. He talked about a 
meeting he had with de Valera earlier in the month. De Valera called the IRA's collusion 
with the Germans a "tragic difficulty" which plagued him and his Government by forcing 
them to take firm administrative action against men who were moved to violence and 
matyrdom by their strong resentment against Partition. Maffey summarized Eire's 
problem: 
On the one side you have the simple practical administrative principle that no 
Government can tolerate direct interference with its own conduct of policy and 
must crush the rebel ruthlessly. On the other side you have crowds and marchings 
and bands and Requiem Masses ... it seemed to me that patriotism in the case of 
many of these men is nothing more than a cloak to cover the gangster and the 
anarchist. 155 
154 Ibid, xx. 
155 PRO CAB 129/ 10, " Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affai rs," 25 May, 1946, 2 . 
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During the war, de Valera instituted strict censorship that "had a powerful effect 
in keeping would-be martyrs in check." 156 Once publicity was again available, Maffey 
feared there would be undoubtedly successors to the IRA. Indeed there were. By 1949, 
more than five armed and militant Irish republican organizations made their existence 
public and carried out operations against the British and Dublin governments. 157 Maffey 
blamed the war for the deterioration of negotiations over Partition, pointing out that 
Chamberlain had been "anxious to end Partition." Maffey believed that those days had 
gone, though, and that "the blood sacrifice tradition in Ireland is strong." 158 This 
insightful and melancholy observation demonstrates a feeling of the oppo1tunity lost 
between Britain and Eire as a result of the war. The lost opportunity came from British 
reluctance to separate Irish republican violence from official state government. Granted, 
this a more difficult distinction to make when the official state governors were, as in the 
case of the Free State, proud former republican terrorists. However, the desire to see 
insurgents smashed brutally by the military might of a country is detrimental to solving 
the problem. It was in 1939, and it remains so today. 
Irish author Richard English, in his 2009 book on terrorism, begins by saying, 
"we face two kinds of terrorist problem. One is practical, the other analytical, and our 
difficulties in responding to the former have been significantly exacerbated by our 
fail ings in regard to the latter." 159 One of the difficulties of relating the IRA' s experiences 
in the Second World War to current counter-terrori st or counter-insurgency operations is 
156 Ibid . 
157 Brian Hanley, The lRA.· A Documentary Histo,y 1916-2005 (Dublin: Gill & McM illan, 20 10), 133. 
158 PRO CAB 129/ 10, 2. 
159 Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond (Oxford University Press, 2009), ix. 
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the nearl y overwhelming obstacle of semantics.160 More than in any other hi storical 
field , the study of terrorism and insurgency suffers from an academy-wide unwillingness 
to define what a terrorist is, and when a terrorist may actually be an insurgent instead. If 
Sean Russell 's IRA in 1939 were terrorists, then perhaps actions taken against them and 
lessons learned there may not be useful in Afghanistan's counterinsurgency. If, however, 
the IRA was an insurgency, then perhaps the Taliban government in Afghanistan is, in 
fact, a terrorist organization and demands a different approach. Scholars across the field 
speak directly past one another and, unfortunately, any attempt to step forward and offer 
a concrete definition of one or more of these terms would be met with such monumental 
criticism that nearly all historical writers preface their works with a discussion of the 
insubstantial nature of the word terrorist and insurgent. While such a preface may be, in 
fact, necessary, the result is a historical field dominated by circular conversation and 
which lacks a defining text. The IRA offers some help to this problem, as the 
organization has persisted for over a century and is the only potential terrorist 
organization with any such persistence. While there are scholars who claim that certain 
acts are terrorist and others which are insurgent in nature, any of them might find IRA 
actions to fi t their paradigms, and the persistent nature of the IRA offers scholars the 
ability to see how and why actions may or may not have manifested as terrorist or 
insurgent. 
What follows is a brief treatment of the development of COIN historiography. 
This treatment is not meant to be exhaustive and does not begin to cover the breadth or 
depth of the histories of Algeria, Vietnam, the American Civil War, Afghanistan, or Iraq. 
160 This point here is not to engage in a discursive analysis of the word " terrorism," but rather to subvert 
that common argument by point out that regard less of where scholars might find themselves in that 
argument, the subj ect matter of this thesis can be usefully applied. 
The connections made in this section are drawn specifically to link the IRA to the 
historiography of COIN, not to comment on the strengths or weaknesses of COIN 
theories as they've been applied in other conflicts. 
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The IRA's experience in the Second World War also offers a fundamentally 
useful set of evidence for counter-insurgency scholars. Like the field of terrorism history, 
counter-insurgency (COIN) histories offer a wide variety of definitions and prescriptions 
for future success and explanations for past failures. COIN histories effectively enter the 
academy in the 1950s and 60s with the publications of French officers serving during the 
Algerian insurgency, specifically David Galula and Roger Trinquier. 161 The important 
difference between these two seminal COIN writers is that Trinquier is noted for 
advocating making use of every weapon available to the enemy to destroy him. 162 
Galula, by contrast, offers a less vehement set of steps to pursue victory against the 
insurgent, one that focuses on the capitalization of the non-concrete resources of a 
country, namely the hearts and minds of the population. The theories created by Galula 
and Trinquier, then, set the standard for the considerations of defeat and victory against 
the insurgent. For these writers, the hearts and minds and the enemy's will to continue 
violent resistance against official governments are the keys to effective COIN . This 
debate, that is, the debate over the usefulness of capturing hearts and minds and the 
means necessary to do so, has largely shaped the COIN historiography and is reflected 
161 C.E. Calwell 's Small Wars substantially predates Trinquier and Galula; however, Calwell's experiences 
with COIN in the Boer War are considered too outdated by the I 960s to be usefu l in COIN. Whether or 
not this is true is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
162 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1961 ), I. Trinquier is keen to point out that 
the major power should make use of every weapon available to his enemy, rather than making use of every 
weapon available to himself. This point was a result of contention between himself and Galula during the 
Algerian insurgency over the use of helicopters and torture, the former or which Trinquier found 
unnecessary, as the Algerians did not have hel icopters and the latter which he found useful, as the 
Algerians were also engaging in the torture of French soldiers. 
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similarly in the discussions of pacification and counter-insurgency in Vietnam. For 
example, Andrew Krepinevich ' s The Army and Vietnam claims that "the Army ignored 
the basic requirement of counterinsurgency: a secure population committed to the 
government." 163 Krepinevich's criticism of the Army ' s operations centers on its inability 
to deny the Viet Cong " [their] source of strength- access to the people." 164 This 
criticism is denied by other historians of pacification, such as Richard Hunt, who 
suggests that the Army's COIN strategy in Vietnam was pacification, and that that policy 
was effective specifically because it was able to take from the VC that organization' s 
access to willing participants. 165 
The most recent development in the counterinsurgency debate, that is, the debate 
on whether or not the efficacy of COIN policy hinges on the deprivation of human 
resources to the enemy, has appeared in works by John Nag! and Mark Moyar. In 
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife and A Question of Command respectively, Nagl and 
Moyar discuss the necessity of controlling the enemy' s personnel through the 
manipulation of the hearts and minds, but each author adds another useful component to 
understanding the successes and failures of COIN. Nag! suggests that the capacity of the 
great power' s mi litary to learn and adapt is key to successful COIN. He compares the 
troubled experience of the U.S. Army in Vietnam with the relatively successful COIN 
operations of Great Britain in Malaya and makes a strong case. Moyar contributes to the 
discussion by stating, perhaps too strongly, that local commanders are crucial to effective 
COIN. To all of these questions, namely the issue of human resource deprivation, Army 
163 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 
197. 
164 Ibid. 
165 For more on pacification, see Richard Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle fo r Vietnam 's Hearts 
and Minds (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998). 
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learning, and local command, the interwar battles against IRA violence and the wartime 
struggle for good intelligence offer insight. 
For example, the local Garda reports of the Irish public turning blind eyes to IRA 
gunmen in the street shows how little effort was put into curbing IRA sympathy. While 
the Free State Government certainly engaged in censorship campaigns targeting War 
News and An Poblacht, these efforts were viewed as direct attacks against the IRA, rather 
than efforts to disincentivize IRA sympathy. The result was, like in Krepinevich's 
model, a population that lacked commitment to the government. This lack of 
commitment is further visible in the pitiful enlistment numbers for Eire's Local Defense 
Forces. 
COIN in Eire, if it can be so called, is not a total failure, however, and sheds light 
on John Nagl's prescriptions on effective counterinsurgency. While, as this thesis 
demonstrated, Britain's perspectives on the IRA were largely misconstrued at the start of 
the war, as the war progressed, British intelligence simply got better. By the war's end, 
SIS and MIS had effectively thrown in with the Dublin government and had adapted. 
Paul McMahon's British Spies and Irish Rebels details specific ways in which the British 
Intelligence Directorate "came to terms with Irish independence." 166 McMahon blames 
the Intelligence Directorate for the poor policy decisions made regarding neutral Eire in 
the war. However, as Nagl points out, militaries need time to adapt. Granted, they also 
need good intelligence to adapt, but it should be pointed out that many of the 
technologies and tactics for intelligence gathering in the 1930s were new, and most of 
them were being innovated in the field by British intelligence services. For example, as 
the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) worked to crack German encryption 
166 The title of Chapter 14 British Spies and Irish Rebels is "Coming to Terms with Irish Independence." 
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and monitor wireless traffic, what was being done about IRA saboteurs meeting in pubs 
with torn currency notes to identify one another? When British intelligence relied on the 
snitch as its prime mode of human intelligence gathering, what tactics were left when the 
IRA began assassinating snitches and perceived snitches with impunity?167 The answer 
to each of these questions informs Mark Moyar's A Question of Command. 
Moyar' s book claims that the local commander, more than any other factor, is 
responsible for the success or failure of COIN operations. A Question of Command 
overstates this point, looking to the American Civil War and the its aftermath to describe 
how commanders that were in touch with the people around them were more effective in 
bringing those people to heel. He then observes a pattern between effective and 
ineffectual COIN commanders from the Civil War to the War in Iraq, dealing with the 
Philippine insurgency in between, to justify this claim. While these conflicts are too 
disparate to be helpful to such a claim, the claim itself is worthy of consideration. Are 
local commanders the lynchpin of effective COIN? The British intelligence chiefs 
certainly believed they were by the end of the Second World War. Whether the British 
surrender of IRA investigation to the Dublin government was an act of desperation or of 
canny COIN policy, the fact that IRA violence was effectively checked by Irishmen in 
Dublin, not the British from London, lends some interesting credence to Moyar's claims. 
In conclusion, the experience of the IRA in the Second World War offers to future 
scholars a field worth further investigation. As Chapter I demonstrated, the IRA, or more 
correctly, militant Irish republicanism, was prolific and spreading throughout the Irish 
167 This thesis does not specifically cover the implications of the assassination campaign, but from the 1916 
rebellion to the Second World War, British Intelligence and the Garda marked a dramatic and steady 
decline in informants, as the IRA became culturally aware and violently opposed to the sharing of 
information. For more on the assassination campaign and its efficacy, see Geraghty , The Irish War. 
80 
diaspora. This is important because it offers scholars of nationalism, emigration, and 
identity a new source of material. Scholars like Paul Gilroy may be well served with a 
look at the international nature oflri sh nationalism and its violent manifestations; 
particularly, for Gilroy, as the Irish struggles over race, state, and nation are against the 
same group of British people with whom his "Black Britons" struggle.168 
Chapter II offered a look at the capacity of the interwar IRA and a sobering 
perspective on terrorist activity. This chapter, more than the others, demonstrates a 
fundamentally dangerous dimension of counter-terrorist, counterinsurgency operations; 
that is, the over-reaction that comes from pre-existing notions about people. Chapter II 
offers an important set of evidence to scholars like Prime Minister Netanyahu and his 
supporters, the most fundamental piece of which is the general disarray and 
ineffectiveness of many terrorist groups. Particularly in the wake of attacks, it is easy for 
policy makers to descri be and believe that the perpetrators of bombings, hijackings, and 
murders represent a well -oiled machine that, without decisive and massive and 
unrelenting action, will never slow and cannot be stopped. At least with the IRA, that 
was not true. IRA violence continued after World War II, to be sure. Its escalation 
during the Troubles of the 1970s and 80s was particularly deadly. However, in large part 
due to the experiences and evolution of British intelligence during the Second World 
War, an Afghanistan-style invasion oflreland has yet to occur, 169 despite IRA rhetoric to 
the contrary. 
168 Paul Gilroy, Ain 't No Black in the Union Jack (University of Chicago Press, 1991 ) . 
169 A note on sensitivity here. T he " invasions" of Ire land by the British include a number of deadly, tragic 
engagements in the early 201h century. Any discussion of Brit ish invasions oflreland would be incomplete 
without a look at the "Black and Tans," special operations sold iers sent to Ire land after the First World 
War. The Black and Tans are one of many sensitive subjects in the military history of Ireland and Britain, 
a history that goes back hundreds of years. Th is statement is intended merely to point out that wh ile British 
policy makers have reacted and overreacted to Irish v iolence in the past, it has not been the policy of the 
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Chapter III described the actions taken by the Great Powers in World War II in 
response to IRA violence. These actions, taken in the context of the inability of the IRA 
to mobilize the kind of resources that British intelligence bel ieved they could, can be seen 
as unnecessary. In this way, Chapter III supports McMahon 's claims that had British 
intelligence been better in the Second World War, relations between the Free State and 
the U.K. would have improved. 
There remains, however, a fairly limited amount of German language research on 
the motivations and thoughts of the Abwehr II commanders with regard to Irish 
republicans and their capacity to act as usefu l saboteurs. This thesis, like other treatments 
of the subject 170 relies heavily on the Public Records Office 's KV2 fi le, commonly called 
"The Haller Report." SIS officials wrote this report from the interrogations of captive 
Abwehr II agents after the war and during the Nuremburg trials. Much of what appears 
in this document has been cross-referenced by SIS and the validity of the recollections of 
the Abwelu· agents is verified where it can be, but regularly throughout the interrogations, 
SIS officers note that much of what is being said intentionally paints a picture of an 
incompetent agency poorly trained. This perspective thus dominates much of the existing 
scholarship on the relationship between Abwehr II and the IRA, and it is the position of 
this thesis that the Abwehr agents sent to Eire were, more or less, incompetent regarding 
various tasks. However, there is much research yet to be done regarding German 
intelligence in the war. For example, it should be point out that Colonel Edmund 
Vessenmayer, the first Abwehr chief given the task of dealing with the Free State, had a 
UK to overreact to IRA terrorism since the Second World War. The author is not insensitive to the Irish 
struggle aga inst the UK, nor is he insensitive to the loss o f life suffered by UK citizens at the hands oflrish 
radicals. 
170 Enno Stephan ' s Sp ies in Ireland and Mark Hull 's German Espionage in Ireland, specifica lly, but also 
McMahon's British Spies and Irish Rebels and Eunan 0 ' 1-lalpin' s Spying on Ireland. 
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massively successful career as an instigator of insurgent violence in Czechoslovakia and 
Romania early in the war. 171 His strategy in accomplishing the destabilization of those 
regions, thus preparing them for German invasion, was through the covert support of 
local radical nationalists. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the IRA seemed an ideal point 
of contact for Abwehr II. Further, Vessenmayer' s success on the continent begs 
questions about the likelihood that German spies were, in fact, not proficient at sowing 
the seeds of revolution in foreign lands. That they failed in Ireland may not be, as much 
of the current scholarship claims, a function of German incompetence but may be, as this 
thesis suggests, a result of good strategy placed over poor tactical potential. The IRA 
simply was not what Germany thought it was. 
As a whole, this thesis has argued that the IRA appeared to be a spreading 
terrorist power in the late 1930s. Its connections in the U.S., Germany, and the USSR 
specifically made the organization a priority for SIS tlu·eat assessment and its willingness 
to conduct violent operations in the UK made it a viable target for Abwehr sabotage. 
Such was not the case, however; the IRAs connections worldwide were superficial at 
best, and its capacity to conduct operations in the UK was overblown. The result was a 
strategic problem for the Allies, a tactical problem for the Axis, and a political problem 
for the Free State. These problems, when considered together, provide insight into the 
importance of terrorist organizations and small state nationalism to military history. 
171 Edmund Vessenmayer was g iven credit for the Abwehr' s successes in instigating UST ASHA violence 
in Croatia as well as the defection of General Kvaternik, which Jed to the declaration of Croatian 
independence from Yugos lavia after the Germans invaded that country (Yugoslavia). PRO KV2/762, 
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